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INTRODUCTION 
When the Supreme Court last Term handed down a trio of 
decisions on state sovereign immunity1 it provoked an 
immediate outcry. Justice Stevens, speaking in dissent, 
reportedly "accused the majority of constructing a doctrine of 
sovereign immunity 'much like a mindless dragon that 
indiscriminately chews gaping holes in Federal statutes,"' and 
warned that "the Court was returning to 'the brief period of 
confusion and crisis when our new nation was governed by the 
Articles of Confederation."'2 Many commentators echoed his 
concerns.3 And while the direct, practical effects of the decisions 
1. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999). 
2. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Federalism; States Are Given New 
Legal Shield by Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1999, at A1 (noting that this 
language-from Justice Stevens' oral rebuttal-did not appear in his written dissent). 
3. See, e.g., In 3 Decisions, Divided Court Strengthens States' Rights, STAR 
TRIBUNE, June 24, 1999, at 17 A (quoting Professor Chemerinsky as stating that the 
decisions are "a radical change in American government" and that "the states can violate 
federal law with impunity, and nowhere can they be sued for damages in a federal or 
state court"); David G. Savage, High Court's Conservatives Change Balance of Power, 
L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1999, at A1 (quoting Professor Tribe as saying that "Activism 
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are far-reaching,4 their reasoning is likely to have yet broader 
influence. 
In A lden v. Maine, a majority of the Court announced that 
state sovereign immunity is a freestanding constitutional 
doctrine5 that ranks with guarantees such as "the right to trial 
by jury and the prohibition on unreasonable searches and 
seizures."6 By embracing state sovereign immunity as a 
constitutionally protected right independent of the Eleventh 
Amendment, 7 the Court gave itself license to determine 
doesn't even describe these holdings. They are extraordinary."); but see, e.g., Kathleen 
M. Sullivan, Editorial, Federal Power, Undimmed, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999, at 17 
("Some of the reaction [to the decisions] has been hyperbolic."). 
4. In Alden, the Court held that Congress's Article I powers do not permit it to 
a uthorize private damages actions against states in their own courts. See Alden, 119 S. 
Ct . a t 2266. In College Savings Bank, the Court upheld the dismissal of a suit under the 
Lanham Act on the grounds that (1) Congress could not abrogate state immunity from 
claims under the Lanham Act for false advertising because such claims did not implicate 
property interests protected under the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) state sovereign 
immunity cannot be constructively waived. See College Sav. Bank , 119 S. Ct. at 2225, 
2228. In Florida Prepaid, finally, the Court held invalid Congress's abrogation of state 
immunity from patent infringement claims on the ground that it had not been shown 
that the abrogation was necessary to remedy or prevent state violations of patent 
holders' Fourteenth Amendment property interests. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 
2207, 2209-10. 
Taken together, these decisions (1) reaffirm that Congress may not abrogate 
state sovereign immunity under its Article I powers; (2) demonstrate that the Court will 
scrutinize narrowly any attempt at abrogation pursuant to Congress's enforcement 
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) foreclose the possibility that a private 
litigant might escape the Court's sovereign immunity doctrines by suing in state court; 
and (4) sound the death knell for the doctrine of constructive waiver. 
5. S ee Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246 ("(T]he sovereign immunity of the States neither 
derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment."). 
6. Id. at 2256; see also id. at 2246-47 (arguing that "the States' immunity from 
suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the 
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today . .. except as altered by the 
plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments"); compare id. at 2270 n.1 
(Souter, J ., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ. , dissenting) (noting that in 
contrast to the rights to jury trials and to freedom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, "the general prerogative of sovereign immunity appears nowhere in the 
Constitution"). 
7. Some opinions prior to Alden had indicated that, in addition to the Eleventh 
Amendment, more obscure constitutional principles of state sovereign immunity also 
limited federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U .S. 410, 441 n .5 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J. , dissenting) (adverting to "contexts in which this 
Court has invoked the constitutional plan to find a State was not amenable to an 
unconsented suit despite the absence of express protection in the Constitution"); Monaco 
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (refusing to "assume that the letter of the 
Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against nonconsenting 
States"); In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (stating that unconsented suits 
against a state by its own citizens are barred by "the fundamental rule of which the 
amendment is but an exemplification"). Alden, however, broadens that protection yet 
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questions of state immunity by reference to the system of 
federalism as a whole, unconstrained by the text or history of 
the Amendment.8 Accordingly, the Court supported its holding 
in Alden by referring to the views that prevailed at the time of 
the Constitution's framing, to background principles of English 
and colonial law, to subsequent congressional and judicial 
perspectives, and to the competing interests accommodated by 
th e federal system.9 
In practical terms, the latter consideration appears to have 
carried the day, for at its core Alden concerns the allocation of 
power, both between state and federal governments and within 
the federal government. Alden invokes the Framers' "insight 
that freedom is enhanced by the creation of two governments , 
not one."10 While "Congress has ample means to ensure 
compliance with valid federal laws, ... it must respect the 
sovereignty of the States."11 In addition, Alden posits that the 
separation of powers within the federal government helps to 
protect state sovereignty: though Congress can enact laws that 
bind the states, Congress generally12 cannot authorize damages 
actions by private individuals to enforce those laws against the 
states. 13 Instead, in most circumstances such damages actions 
must be brought by the United States itself-a rule that not 
further by extending its reach to state courts. See Bernard James, The States' Rights 
Cases Provoke Fire, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, August 16, 1999, at B10 ("With the cases 
of the 1999 term ... the justices have extended the immunity of states beyond a mere 
limit on federal judicial power into a natural and indigenous right of sovereignty with an 
uncertain scope."). 
8. However, the Alden majority maintained that its vision of the federal structure 
implements the intent of the Constitution's Framers and ratifiers. See infra note 94. 
9. See Part I.B. below. 
10. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268; but see Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path:" A Theory of Judicia.l Enforcement of Federalism, 
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1463 (1995) ("In our modern regulatory state, two layers of 
government seem as likely to impose double as to impose half the burdens that a single 
layer of government would impose."). 
11. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268. 
12. For exceptions, see Part LA. below. 
13. The dissenting members of the Court observed, however, that removing 
Congress's power to authorize private suits against States would have the effect of 
centralizing federal enforcement efforts against states. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2240 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
joined by Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (noting that forcing Congress to 
"create a federal damages-collecting 'enforcement' bureaucracy charged with 
responsibilities that Congress would prefer to place in the hands of States or private 
citizens .. . makes it more difficult for Congress to decentralize governmental 
decisionmaking and to provide individual citizens, or local communities, with a variety of 
enforcement powers"). 
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only forces the federal government to allocate scarce resources to 
fund sud1 suits, but also requires the Executive branch to take 
political responsibility for the litigation. 14 
The Cou_rt's r ecent proscription of most private suits against 
states \Nill force a closer examination of what counts as a suit by 
the United States1"---a question that is cun-ently the subject of 
vigorous ciebate in the context of qui tam suits against states . 
The tcun device permits private persons to sue third 
narties-on their o';vn behalf and that of the federal 
i 
gove-rnlTlent--and t o share the resulting recovery with the 
United States. 16 Recently, five Circuits have been asked to 
deci(le whether p:rivate qui tam plaintiffs can bring such a suit 
against an unconsenting state in the absence of the federal 
r.~ .r1 · "L 1 ·-t 1 •. , 1 govenl tn 2Ilt. 11 our vn·cun.s nave sma yes; one nas sma no; ana 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment of 
one of th e fourY If the Court reaches the sovereign immunity 
questioa, and if a majority of the Court applies the Alden 
analysis, it appears lik ely that the immunity analysis will turn 
largely Oil the United States' participation in, responsibility for, 
and ability to control the litigation. Because qui tam suits in 
which the United Sta tes does not intervene fail t o meet the 
~Alden Court's ":rule18 that the National Government must itself 
deem the case of sufficient importance to take action against the 
State,"19 it appears probable that the Cour t would conclude that 
states are immune from suit s pressed solely by qui tam 
14. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269. 
15. See Evan H. Caminker, State Immunity Waivers for Suits by the United States, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 92, 93-94 (1999) [hereinafter Caminker, State Immunity Waivers] 
(noting the Supreme Court's view that, as part of the constitutional plan, states waived 
sovereign immunity from suits brought by the United States, and observing that "[s]ince 
the Court has severely curtailed congressional authority to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity and has made specific consent to suit more difficult to prove, the ultimate 
scope of state sovereign immunity turns in significant part on the scope of this 'plan 
waiver' for United States suits"). 
16. See Part II below. 
17. See infra notes [97-100] and accompanying text. 
18. This "rule" is dictum, at least insofar as it would extend to qui tam suits 
against states. See Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 120 n.126 
(observing that in Alden "the Court was illustrating a distinction between conventional 
private suits to enforce private rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
conventional government-initiated suits brought by the Secretary of Labor. There was 
no argument that the private plaintiffs were asserting any sovereign legal interests, 
indeed, any interests other than their own personal ones; and thus there was no occasion 
for the Court to consider the relevance, if any, of the form of litigation brought on behalf 
of the United States."). 
19. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269. 
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plaintiffs . 20 
Alden's influence, however, will extend beyond cases in 
which the United States fails to take an active part. Questions 
concerning the United States' role-and the implications of that 
role for st ate sovereign immunity-can also arise when the 
United States itself litigates a claim against a state. In 
particular , one doctrine that merits reexamination in the light of 
A.lden concerns litigation pressed jointly by the United States 
and an Indian tribe. 21 Though the Eleventh Amendment applies 
to damages suits against states by Indian tribes,22 the federal 
government, in fulfilment of its trust obligations to Indian 
tribes, can sue a state for damages on a tribe's behalf. 23 In 
Arizona v. California ,24 moreover, the Court held that Indian 
t r ibes can intervene in an action in which the United States 
asserts claims on their behalf, and can participate actively and 
independently in the litigation of the case.25 The Arizona Court 
recog:nized the importance of tribal participation in such 
lawsuits as a means of involving Indian tribes in the 
determination of their rights. 26 In fact, the Arizona doctrine has 
come into increasing use in recent years as tribal litigants, and 
the United States, assert claims against states for violations of 
federal law.27 In a post-Alden world, however, Arizona's 
usefulness might at first seem a point of vulnerability: to the 
extent that Arizona intervention permits an Indian tribe to 
affect the outcome of litigation, states'-rights advocates might 
contend that Arizona offends Alden's notions of federal 
accountability and control. Indeed, the tribes in Arizona were 
20. See generally Part II below. 
21. "Indian tribe" has long been a term of art in federal law. Accordingly, since 
this Article examines historical interactions between Native American governments and 
the federal system, it refers to such governments as "Indian tribes" or "Indian nations." 
Cf Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 679 (1989) ("Using the words 'Indian tribes' ... underscores the 
distinct political experiences oflndian tribes .... "). 
22. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781-82 (1991). 
23. S ee Parts IV.A.l. and IV.A.2. below. 
24. 460 U.S. 605 (1983). 
25. See Part III.A. below. 
26. See Arizona, 460 U.S. at 615. 
27. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, Nos. 80-CV-930 & 80-CV-960, 1999 WL 
509442, at '<13 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 1999); Seneca Nation v. New York, 26 F. Supp.2d 555, 
563-65 (W.D.N.Y. 1998), affd per curiam, 178 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. 
Ct. 785 (2000); Seneca Nation v. New York, No. 93-CV-688A, slip op. at 7-9 (W.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 18, 1998) (Mag. J . op.), adopted, Seneca Nation v. New York, No. 93-CV-688A, slip 
op. at 2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1998); United States v. Idaho, No. CV 94-0328, slip op. at 8-10 
(D. Idaho Nov. 9, 1995). 
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granted leave to intervene precisely because they had something 
to gain, and something to contribute, through their participation 
in the suit-in short, because their positions differed in 
pertinent respects from those taken by the United States. 
As shown below, any apparent tension resolves itself upon 
closer analysis. This Article examines Arizona intervention 
through the lens of Alden's federal-private plaintiff distinction 
and concludes that, even under the Court's current expansive 
vie'N of state immunity, Arizona intervention is amply justified. 
Part I of the Article reviews the Court's recent t reatments of 
state sovereign immunity and describes Alden's focus on the 
differences between suits by private litigants and suits by the 
United States. Part II, using qui tam suits as an example, 
discusses the likely doctrinal effect of the Alden Court's 
ernphasis on federal participation in and control of suits against 
states. Part III posits that the Arizona Court approved the use 
of tribal intervention specifically in order to supplement-an d 
sometimes contradict-the positions taken by the United States 
and notes that none of the Court's subsequent decisions have 
called this approval into doubt. Part IV argues that despite 
Alden's emphasis on federal control, the Arizona doctrine 
provides a permissible, and necessary, avenue for tribal 
participation in United States suits against states. Part V, 
finally, examines practical questions likely to arise from Arizona 
intervention. 
As the above summary suggests, this Article has a 
deliberately narrow focus. It does not address competing 
theories of the Eleventh Amendment;28 nor does it canvass the 
28. The "diversity" theory, for example, holds that the Amendment was intended 
merely to remove diversity jurisdiction as a basis for suing a state in federal court; under 
this interpretation, states could still be sued by individuals in federal court on other 
bases-for instance in federal question cases. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 
120 S. Ct. 631, 652-53 (2000) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting in part); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 101-02 (1996) (Souter, J., 
joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 
U.S. 234, 286-87 (1985) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., 
dissenting); Edward Hartnett, A "Uniform and Entire" Constitution; Or, What if 
Madison Had Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 265 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole 
Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 544 (1997); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State 
Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13, 19; Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and 
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J . 1425, 1474-75 (1987); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The 
Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhu'rst Case, 98 HARv. L. REV. 61, 67-68 (1984); 
William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow 
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against 
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh 
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weaknesses 1n the Alden Court's analysis. 29 Instead, it accepts 
t h e Court's broad view of state sovereign immunity as a 
constitutional principle and approaches Arizona intervention 
from that standpoint. Similarly, in assessing the federalism 
issues raised by Arizona intervention, this Article refers to 
principles of federal Indian law withou t extensive examination 
of their origin. Such uncritical use is generally inadvisable, 
given th e g-rim history of this nation's dealings with Native 
Americans.30 But since the Court's curr ent vision of state 
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 
1937-38 & n.257 (1983). A recent refinement of this theory argues that the Amendment 
was intended to eliminate "party-based jurisdiction as a potential vehicle for the judicial 
enforcement of old state debts" incurred before the Constitution took effect. See James 
E. Pfander , History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh 
Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1277-78 (1998). 
Another approach-the common-law theory- maintains that the Amendment 
was intended to make clear that federal jurisdiction over suits by citizens of one state 
against another state was not constitutionally required; in this view, the Amendment's 
purpose was merely "to allow sovereign immunity to survive as a common law 
requirement," but not to foreclose the possibility of congressional or judicial modification 
of the doctrine. See Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign 
Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 543 (1977). Similarly, proponents 
of the "abrogation" theory believe the Amendment to limit only the power of the courts, 
leaving Congress free to curb the states' immunity. See Laurence H. Tribe, 
Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of 
Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 693-95 (1976); 
John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against 
State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1468-69 (1975). A literalist interpretation, finally, would bar all 
suits against a state by citizens of another state or citizens or subjects of foreign states 
(no matter whether the claim involves a federal question or not) but not suits by other 
sorts of plaintiffs. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh 
Amendment, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1342, 1371 (1989); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty 
and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 65 (1989). 
29. See, e.g., Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and 
Breyer, JJ. , dissenting); Charles Fried, Editorial, Supreme Court Folly, N.Y. TIMES, July 
6, 1999, at A17 (describing the Court's opinions in Alden, College Savings Bank and 
Florida Prepaid as "nothing short of bizarre"). 
30. Professor Frickey has observed that "[t]he history of federal Indian law .. . has 
been filled with tragedy, a story in which the rule of law often has become a vehicle to 
rationalize what can only be understood as crimes against humanity." PhilipP. Frickey, 
Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in 
Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 427 (1993); see also Resnik, supra note 21, 
at 696 (noting that in contrast to the usual sources of federal power, "other, often 
unspoken rationales--<:onquest, violence, force-are the primary sources of the power 
exercised by the federal government over Indian tribes"); see, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. 515, 543 (1832) ("[Plower, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are 
conceded by the world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom they 
descend."). Thus, "unless injected with a heavy dose of historical perspective and legal 
realism, formal lawyerly analysis not only fails to illuminate the issues in federal Indian 
law, but can also result in deceiving conclusions." PhilipP. Frickey, Adjudication and its 
Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 
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sovereign immunity focuses on the structure of the federal 
system as conceived by the Framers, the application of that 
vision to tribal claims asks how federal law views Indian t r ibes 
within the feder al system-even if that view may be doctrinally 
flawed. \Vithin these constraints, this Article examines how 
A rizona intervention should fare under the Court's present 
analysis of state sovereign immunity, and it is with the latter 
th at the inquiry properly begins. 
I. T HE COURT'S CURRENT VIEW OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The Eleventh Amendment's text, as commentators 
fr equently note31 and courts are constrained to admit, 32 provides 
only that "[t]he J udicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."33 
Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
i\ mendment-or its penumbra34-to bar a number of other kinds 
of suits, including suits against a state by its own citizens,35 
1757 (1997); see also Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the Future: Natiue American 
S overeignty in the 21st Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 217 , 301-02 (1993). 
31. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Constitutionalizing Federalism: A Foundational 
Analysis , 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1237, 1266 (1997) ("Once one abandons the constraints 
imposed by the confused and misguided federalism theory that has puzzlingly grown up 
around the Eleventh Amendment, one is restrained only by the narrow contours of the 
provision's text."); Shapiro, supra note 28, at 67 ("The language of the eleventh 
amendment does not include the term 'sovereign immunity' or anything resembling it."). 
32. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (conceding that "the 
text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction 
of the federal courts"). 
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XI . 
34. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) 
("[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, 
but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms . ... "). One 
commentator has remarked that the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence "involves a sort of penumbral reasoning: notwithstanding that there is 
nothing in the Eleventh Amendment to bar suits not in law or equity or suits brought by 
a state's own citizens from the federal courts, the Supreme Court has consistently found 
that such suits are barred by general doctrines of federalism and state sovereignty that 
are inherent in the constitutional plan, though not present anywhere in the 
constitutional context." Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1333, 1341 (1992); see also, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the 
Constitution Without Really Trying: Lessons from the Repeal of Prohibition to the 
Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 217, 219 n.12 (1995) ("To give 
sovereign immw1ity some life . .. the Supreme Court has basically ignored the 
Amendment's language and construed the Amendment as embodying or exemplifying 
the concept of state sovereign immunity."). 
35. See Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U.S. 1, 4, 21 (1890) (holding that a state cannot be 
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suits against a state by a foreign state36 and suits against a 
state by an Indian tribe. 37 
Until recently, it seemed that there existed a range of 
circumstances under which private plaintiffs cou ld nonetheless 
sue a state. State officers could be sued for injunctive relief 
pursuant to the doctrine of Ex parte Young,38 a n d st ates 
themselves could be sued under federal statutes that abrogated 
state soverei~n immunity. 39 States could, of course, explicitly 
consent to suit,40 and it also appeared possible-albeit 
unlikely-that under certain very narro<N circurn_stances a state 
could be found to have constructively waived immunity to suit.41 
l\!Ioreover, since the Eleventh .L<\men dment speaks only to "[t]he 
Judicial power of the United States," some posit ed that state 
sovereign immunity was simply a principle of forum a llocation 
which provided that states could not be sued without their 
consent in federal court; under this view, plaintiffs could sue 
states in state court without offending any federal constitutional 
principle.42 
sued on a federal claim in federal circuit court by one of its citizens); see also Shapiro, 
supra note 28, at 71 n.56 (noting, but disagreeing with, the argument that Hans "f[ell] 
short of constitutionalizing sovereign immunity"). 
36. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1934). 
37. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779, 782. 
38. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Under Ex parte Young, the Court has recognized an 
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity "for certain suits seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief against state officers in their individual capacities." Idaho v. Coeur 
d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997). 
39. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1989) (plurality 
opinion); id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part) (agreeing with the plurality 
"that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment 
immunity of the States" but expressing disagreement "with much of [the plurality's] 
reasoning"); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (overruling Union 
Gas). 
40. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (noting 
the "well-established" principle that "if a State waives its immunity and consents to suit 
in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action"). 
41. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
131 F.3d 353, 363 (3d Cir. 1997) (positing, though not deciding, that "a state's Eleventh 
Amendment immunity can be constructively waived if: (1) Congress enacts a law 
providing that a state will be deemed to have waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity 
if it engages in the activity covered by the federal legislation; (2) the law does so through 
a clear statement that gives notice to the states; (3) a state then engages in that 
activity ... ; and (4) the activity in question is not an important or core government 
function"), affd on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Note, Reconceptualizing the 
Role of Constructive Waiver After Seminole, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1759, 1769 (1999) 
(arguing that "constructive waiver represents a feasible means of fostering state 
accountability for violating federal law within the bounds of the Court's Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence"). 
42. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 
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'Within the past fevv years , however, the Court has n arrmved 
or eliminated all ft·tese EtVeD.ues except for those held open by Ex 
parte Young~3 and the d octrine of explicit state consen.t. 44 VVhile 
YALE L.J. 1683, 1690, 1708-14 (1997) (reviewing cases that support a forum-allocation 
theory but noting the possibility "that a state may avoid the exercise of federal judicial 
power simply by refusing to consent to a suit against it in its own courts"). 
43. Professor Vicki .Jackson has pointed out that the Court's analysis in Seminole 
Tribe may portend a narrowing of the availability of r elief under the doctrine of Ex parte 
Young. See Jackson , supm note 28 , at 498 . Indeed, in Idaho u. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 52 1 
U.S. 261 (1997), decided shortly after Seminole Tribe, the Court once more refused to 
apply the Ex parte Young doctrine . See Jackson, supra note 28, at 546 (noting that the 
Court "twice in two Terms denied apparently prospective relief against state officers to 
vindicate federal law.") But the holding in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, at any rate, is unlikely 
to extend beyond its specific facts . See id. (not ing that "Coeur d'Alene's reasoning may be 
limited to its particular context") . 
In Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the Court rejected an attempt by an Indian tribe and 
certain of its members (collectively the "Tribe") to use the Ex parte Young doctrine to sue 
a state in federal court to assert a beneficial interest in, aboriginal title to and the right 
to possess the banks and submerged lands of Lake Coeur d'Alene. See Idaho v. Coeur 
d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 264-65, 287-88. 
In addition to the relief detailed above , the Coeur d'Alene Tribe plaintiffs also 
sought an order enjoining the defendants "from regulating, permitting or taking any 
action in violation of' the Tribe's ownership interests in the land. Id. at 265. The Court 
concluded that the relief sought was "close to the functional equivalent of quiet title in 
that substantially all the benefits of ownership and control would shift from the State to 
the Tribe" and was "far-reaching and invasive" because it would entail "a determination 
that the lands in question are not even within the regulatory jurisdiction of the State." 
Id. at 282. Moreover, the Court stated, "lands underlying navigable waters have 
historically been considered sovereign lands [and] [s]tate ownership of them has been 
considered an essential attribute of sovereignty." Id. at 283 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Accordingly, the Court concluded that "[u]nder these particular and special 
circumstances," the Eleventh Amendment barred relief against the state officials 
because otherwise "Idaho's sovereign interest in its lands and waters would be affected 
in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its 
Treasury." Id. at 287. 
Even aside from the fact that the five-Justice majority could not agree how to 
determine the applicability of Ex parte Young, compare 521 U.S. at 278-80 (Kennedy, J., 
joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (advocating case-by-case analysis), with id. at 296 (O'Connor, 
J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(criticizing Justice Kennedy's "vague balancing test"), Coeur d'Alene Tribe's holding is a 
narrow one. Three members of the majority noted that in an ordinary case concerning 
"ownership and possession of an ordinary parcel of real property," a court could 
permissibly "find that the [state] officials had no right to remain in possession, thus 
conveying all the incidents of ownership to the plaintiff, while not formally divesting the 
State of its title," but contrasted the Coeur d'Alene Tribe case, where "the Tribe seeks a 
declaration not only that the State does not own the bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene, but also 
that the lands are not within the State's sovereign jurisdiction." I d. at 290-91. 
44. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2258 (1999) ("[W)e have not 
questioned the general proposition that a State may waive its sovereign immunity and 
consent to suit . . .. "). Under the Court's most recent decisions, moreover, Congress 
retains some power to elicit such waivers, for instance by conditioning the grant of 
federal funds on state consent to suit, see id. at 2267 (noting that "subject to 
constitut ional limitations" the federal government may "seek the States' voluntary 
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the Court's recent rulings have obvious :impact on private suits 
against stat es , they also indicate the general approach f~C!.vored 
by a majority of the current Court in weighing questions of stat e 
sovereign immunity. 
A . The Court's Recent Decisions 
In terms of practical effect, the co1·e of the Cour t's r ecent 
holdings is that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign 
immunity under its Article I powers. 45 This view impels , not 
only the Court's decisions with respect to abrogat ion of 
immunity from suit in federal cour t , but also its holdings 
r egarding suits against states in state court and concerning 
constructive waivers of state sovereign immunity. 
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida ,46 the Court held that the 
Indian Commerce Clause47 does not grant Congress the pmver to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity.48 Since the Court conceded 
that "the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater 
transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government 
than does the Interstate Commerce Clause,"49 the Cour t 's 
holding required it to overrule the teaching of Pennsylvania v. 
Union Gas Co. 50 that Congress can abrogate state sovereign 
immunity pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.51 
Leaving no doubt as to the breadth of its view, the Court stated 
flatly that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial 
power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to 
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal 
jurisdiction. "52 
consent to private suits"), though the Court has indicated that Congress cannot make 
such consent a condition of state participation in "otherwise permissible activity," see 
College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2231 (stating that "the point of coercion is automatically 
passed-and the voluntariness of waiver [of state sovereign immunity] destroyed-when 
what is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise 
lawful activity" rather than the denial of federal funds). 
45. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 643 (2000) (noting that 
Seminole Tribe ''held that Congress lacks power under Article I to abrogate the States' 
sovereign immunity" and that the Court's decisions in College Savings Bank, Florida 
Prepaid and Alden "reaffirmed that central holding of Seminole Tribe"). 
46. 517 u.s. 44 (1996). 
47. U.S. CONST., art. I,§ 8, cl.3. 
48. Seminole Tribe , 517 U.S. at 72-73. 
49. Id. at 62. 
50. 491 U.S. 1 (1989); see also supra note 39. 
51. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66 (overruling Union Gas). 
52. Seminole Tribe, 517 U .S. at 72-73; see also, e.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1999) ("Seminole Tribe 
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Of course, Seminole Tribe did not strip Congress of all 
power to abrogate state immunity; so long as Congress Jr.takes 
its intent clear,53 it may still authorize a private damages suit 
against a state "in the exercise of its power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment-an Amendment enacted after the 
Eleventh Amendment and specifically designed to alter the 
federal-state balance."54 However, the Court stressed in College 
Savings Banh v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education 
Expense Board5'3 that this power extends only to "the carefully 
delimited remediation or prevention of constitutional 
violations. "56 Thus, for example, legislation to enforce the 
Fourteenth .l'unendment's guarantee of procedural due process 
must meet certain strict requirements. Congress can validly 
abrogate state sovereign immunity if such abrogation is 
necessary to remedy or prevent state deprivations (without due 
process) of property rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment; 57 but the Court has indicated that it will construe 
narrowly what constitutes such a protected property right. A 
federal statute prohibiting false advertising, for example, does 
not protect a Fourteenth Amendment property right: "business 
in the sense of the activity of doing business, or the activity of 
making a profit is not property in the ordinary sense,"58 since it 
does not encompass the right to exclude others, which is "[t]he 
hallmark of a protected property interest."59 Moreover, even 
when legislating to safeguard a protected property interest such 
as trademarks60 or patents, Congress cannot abrogate state 
sovereign immunity unless it identifies state violations of 
substantive Fourteenth Amendment rights and "tailor[s] its 
makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its 
Article I powers"). 
53. See, e.g., Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2205 (valid abrogation requires both 
that "Congress has 'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate ... "' and that 
Congress has "acted 'pursuant to a valid exercise of power"') (quoting Seminole Tribe, 
517 U.S. at 55). 
54. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. 
Ct. 2219, 2223 (1999) . 
55. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999). 
56. ld. at 2224 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5). 
57. See id. at 2224-25. 
58. Id. at 2225. 
59. Id. at 2224. 
60. See id. ("The Lanham Act may well contain provisions that protect 
constitutionally cognizable property interests-notably, its provisiOns dealing with 
infringement of trademarks, which are the 'property' of the owner because he can 
exclude others from using them."). 
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legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conch.H::t. "61 
Thus, the Court held in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Banh62 that 
Congress's amendment of the patent laws expressly to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity from patent infringement claims was 
invalid because Congress had neither identified a pattern of 
patent infringement by states nor found that states deprived 
patentees of state remedies for such state infringemen t. 63 VVhile 
this analysis does suggest that if states took Florida P repaid as 
a "license ... to lower the Stars and Stripes and raise the ,Jolly 
Roger"64 the resulting pattern of unremedied infringement could 
then provide a basis for abrogation, the Court's approach sets a 
high bar.65 
Similarly, the Court's view of Congress's abrogation powers 
recently cemented its rejection of the doctrine of construct ive 
waiver. Although the Court had held in Parden v. Terminal 
Railway of Alabama State Docks Department66 that a state could 
constructively waive its immunity from suit by choosing to 
engage in an interstate commerce activity regulated by federal 
legislation,67 the retreat from this holding had begun even before 
Seminole Tribe. 68 In College Savings Bank, the Court "drop[ped] 
61. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. 
Ct. 2199, 2207 (1999). The Court's examples of "limits" that might render legislation 
more acceptable, e.g., "providing for suits only against States with questionable remedies 
or a high incidence of infringement," id. at 2210, raise a number of questions, not least of 
which is administrability. These issues, however, fall outside the scope of this Article . 
62. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999). 
63. See id. at 2207, 2209-10. 
64. Peter A. Roberts (the owner of the patent at issue in Florida Prepaid), quoted 
in Sabra Chartrand, Patents, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1999, at C12. 
65. The decision this Term in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 
(2000), demonstrates that the Court will apply a similarly restrictive analysis to 
determine whether Congress has legislated pursuant to its power to enforce the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 120 S. Ct. at 650 (holding that the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 is not a valid exercise of Congress's § 5 
enforcement power, "[i]n light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act's substantive 
requirements, and the lack of evidence of widespread and unconstitutional age 
discrimination by the States"). 
66. 377 U.S. 184 (1964). 
67. See id. at 192 (holding that a state's choice to operate an interstate railroad 
after the enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act constituted consent to suit 
under that Act). 
68. See Employees of Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public 
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973) (distinguishing Parden on the grounds 
that the Fair Labor Standards Act (the statute at issue in Employees) did not clearly 
express an intent to remove the states' immunity and that the state activity in Parden 
"was in the area where private persons and corporations normally ran the enterprise"); 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1974) (holding that in Edelman congressional 
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the other shoe" and held that "[w]hatever may remmn r· OI Ot:tr 
de"l.Sl.v"" in lva ,···a1Pl"' i co .::>Yrj·rp-~slv O"r:>rr11l e •-i " 69 Altn" OUJc•r·t t1v" ('o-t··r-t · ~..., • -"'";.,_ ~--~ \... -' £, .... u '-'""""".! . .L -..-~o..J >..... J V .......... .• v l. .l... ;.::J- - ,J..~.. ........ .__1 4. _ 
noted Parden's conflict with the requirement that ·express 
waivers of state sovereign immunity be unequivocal ,70 it also 
relied heavily upon the restrictions on Congress's ability to 
abrogate. As the Court explained, "Recognizing a congressional 
power to exact constructive waivers of sovereign immunity 
through the exercise of Article I powers would .. . , as a practical 
matter, permit Congress to circumvent the antiabrogation 
holding of Seminole Tribe ."71 
In Alden u. Maine, finally, the Court held that Congress 
lacks the power under Article I to authorize private damages 
actions against stat es in their own courts .72 As a prs.ctical 
matter, Alden rounds out the set of cases that now precludes 
most private damages suits against states; after Alden, it 
appears that private plaintiffs suing alone may only sue a state 
for damages if the state has consented to suit or Cong-ress has 
abrogated state immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of its 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. Additionally, in a 
broader sense, Alden illustrates the Court's current doctrinal 
approach. 
B. Alden and the Court's Theoretical Approach 
Alden's analysis proceeds along two lines, one formal and 
one functional. The formal analysis examines a number of 
factors, which may balance differently in different contexts and 
not all ofwhich will necessarily shed light on a given question of 
state immunity. The functionaF3 analysis is simpler and more 
authorization to sue states was "wholly absent," but also noting that "[c]onstructive 
consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional 
rights"); Welch u. Texas Dep't of Hwys. & Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987) 
(plurality opinion) ("[T]o the extent that Parden u. Terminal Railway . . . is inconsistent 
with the requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress 
must be expressed in unmistakably clear language, it is overruled."); id. at 496 (Scalia, 
J ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that as a matter of 
statutory construction the Jones Act and the FELA should not be read to apply to 
states). 
69. 
70. 
71. 
College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2228. 
See id. at 2228. 
I d. at 2229. 
72. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999). 
73. As will be seen, the Alden Court's functional analysis is limited in important 
ways. When the Court examines the effect that a particular kind of suit against a state 
will have on the balance of power in the federal system, it does so in order to determine 
whether the states consented to such a suit when they agreed to enter the Union- an 
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basic balance struck_ by the federal system. 
1. The formal analysis 
The bulk of the majority op1mon 1n Alden attempts to 
support the Court's holding by resorting to "the Constitution's 
structure, and its histoTy, and the authoritative inter pretat ions 
by this Court."74 Thus, Alden illustrates that the Court will look 
t o certain discrete fa ctors- relevant prov1S1ons of the 
Constitution; the pronov.ncements of the Framers and their 
contemporaries; background principles of English lavv; and 
subsequent congressional and judicial perspectives-to inform 
its discussion of state immunity. 
In A lden, the Cour t opened with an examination of the 
Constitution itself. Th e Court contrasted "[v]arious textual 
prov1s10ns of the Constitution [that] assume the States' 
continued existence and active participation in the fundamental 
processes of governance'' with "[t]he limited and enumerated 
powers granted to the Legisla tive, Executive, and Judicial 
Branches of the National Government."75 To complete the 
picture, the Court noted "th e Tenth Amendment, which, like the 
other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was enacted to allay 
lingering concerns about the extent of the national power."76 
The Court then proceeded t o survey the views of "[t]he 
generation that designed and adopted our federal system," in 
inquiry that is generally non-normative and often somewhat artificial. See, e.g., Alden, 
119 S. Ct. at 2268-69. To the extent that the Court confines itself to this analysis and 
eschews any inquiry into whether the effects of the suit at issue are otherwise desirable, 
its approach can rightly be criticized as formalistic. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism 
and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 969 (1997) 
(arguing that the Court's recent federalism decisions are "formalistic in the classic sense" 
in that "(t)he Court has emphasized deductive reasoning from asserted premises and has 
refused to give weight to functional considerations, whether based on public policy 
needs ... or constitutional values"). This Article, however, uses the term "functional" for 
convenience in contrasting the Court's semi-functional approach with its more "formal" 
inquiry into discrete historical and judicial precedents. 
More broadly, both the formal and functional analyses in Alden can be 
described as originalist-insofar as they reflect the Court's "focus on the Framers' 
original views," Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 112-or 
"reconstructionalist"-to the extent that they seek to "reconstructO the most plausible 
agreement [among the Framers) rather than interpretO conventional historical indicia 
thereof," id. at 113. See infra note 94. 
74. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246. 
75. Jd. at 2247 . 
76. ld. 
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order to support the argument that the Framers "considered 
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Thus, the Court in .Alden cited authorities from English law, the 
ratification debates and documents and the Federalist Papers. 78 
In addition, the Court turned to the lore of Chisholm v. 
Georgia79 and the "text and history" of the Eleventh Amendment 
for fu.rther evidence of contemporary or near-contemporary 
views. 80 
Next, the Court examined its own precedents and past 
congressional practices. In the Court's view, Congress's actions 
constitute a tacit acknowledgment of state immunity in that 
"[n]ot only were statutes purporting to authorize private suits 
against nonconsenting States in state courts not enacted by 
early Congresses, statutes purporting to authorize such suits in 
any forum are all but absent from our historical experience."Sl 
Similarly, the Court maintained, based on evidence such as the 
"sweeping terms" with which prior decisions describe state 
immunity, that "[t]he theory and reasoning of our earlier cases 
suggest the States do retain a constitutional immunity from suit 
in their own courts."82 Finally, the Court measured the question 
at hand against values that state sovereign immunity is 
traditionally thought to promote-state dignity,s3 state 
financess4 and. the integrity of state governmental processes.s5 
2. The functional analysis 
Having examined various discrete sources of information 
that might pertain to the question of state immunity, the Alden 
Court turned to a discussion of the balance of powers within the 
federal system. This part of the Court's analysis centered on the 
nature of the plaintiff. 
The Court explained in Alden that "[a] suit which is 
commenced and prosecuted against a State in the name of the 
United States by those who are entrusted with the 
constitutional duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
77. Id. 
78. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2247-49 (1999). 
79. 2 u.s. 419 (1793). 
80. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2249-53, 2260-61. 
81. Id. at 2261. 
82. Id. at 2262. 
83. See id. at 2263-64. 
84. See id. at 2264. 
85. See id. at 2264-65. 
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executed,' U.S . Const., Art. II , § 3, differs in k ind from the suit of 
an individual"86-an admonition which echoes the Court's 1991 
opinion in Blatchford v. Native Village of JVoatak .87 In 
Blatchford, the plaintiffs contended, inter alia , that 28 U.S.C . 
§ 1362, which governs federal jurisdiction over federal claims by 
Indian tribes, represented "a delegation to tribes of the F ederal 
Government's exem pt ion from state sovereign immunity."88 The 
Court, while r ejecting this argument on grounds of statutory 
construction,89 expressed its "doubt" that such exemption "can 
be delegated-even if one limits the permissibility of 
delegation . . . t o per sons on whose behalf the United States 
itself might sue."90 As the Court saw it, 
[t]he consent, "inherent in the convention," to suit by the United 
States- at the instance and under the control of responsible 
federal officers- is not consent to suit by anyone whom the United 
States might select; and even consent to suit by the United States 
for a particular person's benefit is not consent to suit by that 
person himself. 91 
In Alden, the Court expanded upon the differences-with 
respect to state sovereign immunity-between suits by the 
federal government and private suits. First, "[w]hile the 
Constitution contemplates suits among the members of the 
federal system as an alternative to extralegal measures , the fear 
of private suits against nonconsenting States was the central 
reason given by the founders who chose to preserve the States' 
sovereign immunity."92 Second, "[s]uits brought by the United 
States itself require the exercise of political responsibility for 
each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent 
from a broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting 
States."93 Third, a suit by the federal government by definition 
satisfies the "rule that the National Government must itself 
deem the case of sufficient importance to take action against the 
86. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267. 
87. 501 U.S. 775 (1991). 
88. Id. at 785. 
89. The Court held that there was no evidence that Congress intended § 1362 to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity from suits by Indian tribes. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. 
at 785-86. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267. 
93. Id. 
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State."94 
94. Id. at 2269. In a recent article, Professor Evan Caminker argues that the 
Court's emphasis on whether the United States itself litigates the claim against the 
state is at odds with the Court's originalist approach to state sovereign immunity. 
Professor Caminker points out that in prior decis ions "[t]he Court has pointedly not 
asked whether various aspects of sta te sovereign immunity, or even the concept in its 
entirety, make sense in the modern world of expansive federal r egulatory power; rather, 
the Court has insisted that the means through which this power is asserted and enforced 
conform to its view of the Framers' original understanding as embedded within the 
constitutional plan." Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 132. 
(Indeed, in Alden the majority claimed tha t it sought to discover "only what the Framers 
and those who ratified the Constitution sought to accomplish when they created a 
federal system." Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268.) 
Professor Caminker posits that in the light of relevant precedent, the most 
persuasive originalist explanation for the ability of the United States to sue states is the 
"mutuality rationale." "The reasoning in both Monaco and Blatchford . . . envisions 
anthropomorphized states sitting around a bargaining table and agreeing to a mutual 
pact waiving their immunity for certain kinds of suits but not others. As the Court 
reconstructs this bargain, states agreed to waive their immunity only where doing so 
would mutually benefit the parties to the agreement-meaning the states and the 
United States-and not where it would altruistically benefit outsiders." Caminker, State 
Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 110. In this view, the states would have agreed 
that the United States could sue a state, both because such suits could enable the United 
States to enforce the obligations owed by one state to another, and because such suits 
could enforce obligations owed by a state to the federal government (obligations which 
were "designed in large part for the mutual benefit of the states"). Id. at 110-111. Thus, 
"[a]ccording to the mutuality rationale, a judicial forum should be available whenever 
the United States seeks to assert one of the legal prerogatives or interests bestowed 
upon it in the constitutional design." Id. at 113. Consequently, a state defendant should 
have no sovereign immunity from suits where the United States is the real party in 
interest on the plaintiff side. See id. at 114-15. Professor Caminker also asserts that the 
originalist view should not focus on federal control of such suits, because "the Founding 
generation evidenced little if any concern that prosecutors of federal law violations be 
politically accountable to any centralized federal authority." Id. at 128. Thus, to the 
extent that the Alden Court's functional concerns lead the Court to insist that suits by 
the United States against a state be litigated by the federal government, Professor 
Caminker argues that such a requirement "would necessarily reflect a methodological 
shift from originalism to functionalism, at odds with the Court's claimed basis for the 
legitimacy of this entire realm ofnontextual doctrine." Id. at 132. 
It seems possible, however, that a majority of the current Court might reject 
this elegant argument in favor of an alternative originalist justification for United States 
suits against states. Professor Caminker notes the Court's statements, in Texas, Monaco 
and Alden, that the constitutional plan must permit the United States to sue states in 
order "to provide a forum for the peaceful resolution of intersovereign disputes"-a view 
he terms the "hostility-avoidance" rationale. Id. at 106-07, 111. He rejects this rationale 
because although it "would seem similarly to support an immunity waiver for suits 
brought against states by foreign states or Indian nations," the Court has held that 
sovereign immunity bars both such kinds of suits. Id. at 108. But the Alden Court 
nonetheless stressed that "the Constitution contemplates suits among the members of 
the federal system as an alternative to extralegal measures," Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267, 
suggesting that it continues to give credence to this explanation. And if the Court 
adheres to the hostility-avoidance rationale as the basis for United States suits against 
states, it becomes harder to justify suits not prosecuted by the federal government itself. 
If the government does not, as the Alden majority put it, "deem the case of sufficient 
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At bottom, then, the Court's ruling in Alden was more basic 
than its extensive survey of "history, practice, precedent, and 
the structure of the Constitution"95 might suggest. "The Court 
said, in effect, that the Feder al Government should put its 
money where its mouth is and enforce its own laws rather than 
entrust them to private litigants."96 This conclusion, in turn, 
suggests a further inquiry: vVhat distinguishes a suit by the 
United States from a suit by a private litigant? 
II. QUI TAM SUITS AND THE FEDERAL-PRIVATE PLAINTIFF 
DISTINCTION 
The qw tam suit-which has fed some speculation 
regarding the extent to which Congress might empower 
individuals to enforce federal laws against states97-provides a 
ready illustration of ways in which Alden's reasoning may 
influence analyses of state sovereign immunity. A split of 
opinion has developed between the Second, Fourth, Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits, which hold that qui tam suits litigated solely by 
a private relator are the equivalent of suits by the United States 
for state sovereign immunity purposes, 98 and the Fifth Circuit, 
importance to take [legal) action against the State," Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269, it seems 
unlikely that the dispute could create a serious threat of military conflict between the 
federal and state govemments. 
95. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2260. 
96. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Editorial, Federal Power, Undimmed, N.Y. TIMES, June 
27, 1999, at A17. 
97. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress's Power to 
Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REV. 539, 553, 556-57, 564 (1995) 
(arguing that, since Congress can provide for the United States to sue a state for 
damages arising from an injury to an individual and Congress may authorize private 
parties to prosecute such claims on the United States' behalf as in "the traditional qui 
tam action," Congress "might as well have the power to allow" such suits to be brought 
by private plaintiffs in their own name); but see, e.g., Caminker, State Immunity 
Waivers, supra note 15, at 134 ("Where the 'real party in interest' is private rather than 
the United States itself, qui tam authorization feels like something of a bootstrap; one 
might suspiciously view it as an effort to circumvent the Seminole Tribe I Alden rule that 
Congress cannot authorize private parties to assert their 'own' interests against states."); 
Jackson, supra note 28, at 506 n.46 (noting that Blatchford's reasoning "suggests that 
Siegel's argument will be less successful as statutory schemes move closer to giving non-
U.S. parties control over the litigation"); Vazquez, supra note 42, at 1706 n.110 
(observing that Blatchford "throws cold water" on Siegel's theory); Scott P. Glauberman, 
Citizen Suits Against States: The Exclusive Jurisdiction Dilemma, 45 J. COPYRIGHT 
Soc'Y U.S.A. 63, 103 (1997) (arguing that "Siegel's article amounts to little more than an 
end run around the Eleventh Amendment"). 
98. See United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 
F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999); United States ex rel. 
Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154 F.3d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. dismissed, 119 S. Ct. 2387 
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which holds that such suits violate state sovereign immunity. 99 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case decided by the 
Second Circuit-United States ex rel. Stevens v. 1/ermont Agency 
of Natural Resources 100-and the sovereign immunity issue is 
one of the questions presented for the Court's revievv. Although 
the Court may ultimately dispose of the Stevens case on other 
gTounds,lOl qui tam suits nonetheless provide an informative 
testing ground for Alden's analysis. 
In qui tam actions , a private person "maintains a civil 
proceeding on behalf of both herself and the United States to 
recover damages and/or enforce penalties available under a 
statute prohibiting specified conduct" and "shares any monetary 
recovery with the United States."102 'ViThile the practice of 
authorizing qui tam suits extends back through our nation's 
history to its roots in English law, 103 the most prominent current 
(1999); United States ex rel. Berge v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama, 104 F.3d 
1453, 1458 (4th Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 
957, 963 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 72 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 1995). 
99. See United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 294 (5th 
Cir. 1999). Although the Fifth Circuit declined to state whether the United States could 
change the sovereign immunity analysis by intervening in the suit, it noted that Arizona 
v. California "may be relevant to that question." F'oulds, 171 F.3d at 288 n.13. 
The D.C. Circuit has avoided the sovereig11 immunity issue by construing the False 
Claims Act not to authorize qui tam suits against states, see United States ex rel. Long v. 
SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F .3d 870, 889-90 (D.C. Cir. 1999), opinion 
supplemented, 173 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1999), but in so doing it discussed at some length 
its "profound doubts that the Eleventh Amendment permits" qui tam suits against 
states, see 173 F.3d at 881-86. 
100. 162 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999). 
101. The questions presented also include whether a state is a "person" subject to 
liability under the False Claims Act. See, e.g., Stevens, 162 F.3d at 207-08 (holding that 
states are defendant "persons" under the False Claims Act); Long, 173 F.3d at 889-90 
(holding to the contrary). Moreover, just 10 days before the Court was scheduled to hear 
oral argument in Stevens, it directed the parties to file supplemental briefs "addressing 
the following question: 'Does a private person have standing under Article III to litigate 
claims offraud upon the government?"' Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United 
States ex rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 523 (1999). The State of Vermont responded to this 
invitation by arguing that when a private qui tam plaintiff brings a claim under the 
False Claims Act, either the claim belongs to the United States-in which event 
Vermont argues the private plaintiff lacks standing to assert the claim-or the claim has 
been assigned to the private plaintiff-in which case Vermont contends the suit is barred 
by state sovereign immunity because it does not qualify for treatment as a suit by the 
United States. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens, 1999 WL 1134650, at *53 - *54 (U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript, Nov. 
29, 1999). 
102. Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE 
L.J. 341, 341 (1989) [hereinafter Caminker, Constitutionality]. 
103. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943) 
("Statutes providing for actions by a common informer, who himself has no interest 
whatever in the controversy other than that given by statute, have been in existence for 
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example- and that at issue in each of the cases decided by the 
Circuits that have so far addressed the immunity issue-is the 
cause of action provided by the False Claims Act. 104 
The False Claims Act provides that "[a]ny person" who 
makes a fal se monetary claim to the federal government is liable 
"to the United States Government" for treble damages and a 
civil penalty of $5,000 to $10,000. 105 Besides authorizing the 
United States Attorney General to sue violators, 106 the Act 
. , f' " [ ] t' b . t " rnh " -l ) prov:wes or a c wns y pnva e persons. 1 1 us, a person 
may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the 
person and for the United States Government. The action shall 
be b1·ought in the name of the Government."107 Under the Act, if 
the federal government decides not to intervene, the private 
plaintiff can prosecute the suit on its own.l08 In return, the qui 
tam plaintiff stands to receive as much as 30% of the recovery.l09 
To the courts that countenance qui tam suits against states, 
the United States-despite its absence from the suit-is the 
"real party in interest."110 Thus, it is the United States that 
suffered injury from the defendant's false claim and it is the 
United States that will receive "the lion's share-at least 70%-
hundreds of years in England, and in this country ever since the foundation of our 
Government.") (quoting Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905)), quoted in Caminker, 
Constitutionality, supra note 102, at 341-42; see also Foulds, 171 F .3d at 29 1 n.20 ("Our 
early legisla tors adopted the qui tam concept from the English system."). 
104. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729- 3733 (1994). 
105. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994). 
106. S ee id. § 3730(a). 
107. Id. § 3730(b)(1). A private plaintiff may not sue under the Act "based upon" 
allegations or transactions that have been publicly disclosed (as such disclosure is 
defined in the Act) unless she "is an original source of the information." Id. § 
3730(e)(4)(A) (1994); see, e.g., United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 
Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 938-43 (6th Cir. 1997) (surveying interpretations of the "based upon" 
and "original source" requirements). 
108. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B) (1994). 
109. If the United States chooses not to intervene, the qui tam plaintiff receives "not 
less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or 
settlement," plus "reasonable" expenses, attorneys' fees and costs. Id. § 3730(d)(2). If 
the United States intervenes, the qui tam plaintiff's cut of the proceeds decreases to "at 
least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent;" and in certain circumstances if the 
United States intervenes and the court finds that the action was based primarily on 
information not provided by the qui tam plaintiff, the latter's share of the proceeds will 
be 10 percent or less. !d. § 3730(d)(1). 
llO. United States ex rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154 F .3d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 1998); 
United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A , Inc., 39 F .3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 1994); 
United States ex rel. Berge v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama, 104 F.3d 1453, 
1458 (4th Cir. 1997); United States ex rel . Milam v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson 
Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 50 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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of any recovery."111 And in addition to being the nominal 
plaintiff, the United States retains a certain amount of control 
over the conduct of the action: 
If it wishes to intervene in the action at the outset , the qui tam 
plaintiff cannot prevent it from doing so. Whether or not the 
government intervenes, it has the right to be kept abreast of 
discovery in the qui tam suit and the right to prevent that 
discovery from interfering with its investigat ion or pursuit of a 
criminal or civil suit arising out of the same facts. If the 
government intervenes, it takes control of the lawsuit; it may have 
the participation of the qui tam plaintiff limited; and it is not 
bound by any act of the qui tam plaintiff. The government has 
both the right to prevent a dismissal sought by the qui tam 
plaintiff and the right to cause the action to be dismissed for any 
rational governmental reason, notwithstanding the qui tam 
plaintiffs desire that it continue.112 
But while Alden's analysis r equires courts to assess whether 
and to what extent the federal government controls an action 
against a state, the Court is likely to be more interested in types 
of control that hold the promise of benefits to the state 
defendant, or at least of checks on the qui tam plaintiffs zeal. 
Specifically, by linking the requirement of federal "control" of 
suits against states to "the exercise of political responsibility for 
[the] suit,"113 Alden suggests that the key feature of the relevant 
control is that it enables the United States to moderate its 
litigation stance in response to political pressures. This goal, of 
course, appears to conflict with the aims of the qui tam 
provisions of the False Claims Act, to the extent those provisions 
arise from a concern that "[g]overnment agencies may be 
sufficiently dependent upon (or co-opted by) specific 
players .. . that the desire to prosecute wrongdoers diligently is 
compromised."114 Moreover, it is not intuitively obvious that the 
Executive's duty to "take [c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully 
executed" should require the Executive to give weight to a 
potential defendant's interests when formulating the United 
States' litigation positions. In the case of state defendants, 
however, the Court appears to view such consideration of state 
111. United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 
F .3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1998). 
112. Id. at 202-03 . 
113. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267. 
114. Caminker, Constitutionality, supra note 102, at 351 (discussing possibility of 
co-option by "players in the military-industrial complex"). 
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interests not as a danger but rather as a salutary exercise in 
political accountability. The United States' influence over a 
relator's prosecution of a qui tam suit, then, must be assessed by 
reference to the federal government's ability to curtail the 
claims against the state. 
Measured by this yardstick, many elements of the control 
detailed above are either illusory or else irrelevant. For 
example, the United States' right to intervene in the action is 
not unlimited,115 and in any event that right is, by definition, 
academic in cases where the United States never chooses to 
intervene. Likewise, the fact that the United States, if it 
intervenes, "shall not be bound by an act of the person bringing 
the action"116 seems more suited to the elimination of defenses 
such as waiver or estoppel than to protecting the rights of the 
state. 117 Many of the prerogatives reserved to the United States 
when it chooses not to intervene are also inapposite to the state 
sovereign immunity inquiry. For instance, the United States' 
right to 'keep abreast' of discovery in the qui tam action by 
receiving copies of all pleadings and deposition transcripts118 is 
more likely to assist the United States in pressing related claims 
in other fora-possibly against the state-than it is to further 
the interests of the state defendant. Likewise, the requirement 
that the govemment consent to the dismissal of a qui tam 
action119 offers little apparent benefit to a state defendant.l20 
115. If the government changes its mind after having chosen at the outset of the 
case not to intervene, it must show "good cause" in order to intervene at a later point in 
the case. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (1994). 
116. Id. § 3730(c)(1). 
117. Cf Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917) ("As a 
general rule laches or neglect of duty on the part of officers of the [Federal] Govemment 
is no defense to a suit by it to enforce a public right or protect a public interest."). 
118. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (1994). 
119. See id. § 3730(b)(1) ("The action may be dismissed only if the court and the 
Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for 
consenting."); compare Searcy v. Philips Elecs. North Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 158-59 
(5th Cir. 1997) (Attomey General's consent to voluntary dismissal is required even if 
United States has decided not to intervene); United States ex rel. McGough v. Covington 
Techs. Co., 967 F.2d 1391, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the same), with United States ex 
rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 724 (9th Cir. 1994) (where federal 
government declines to intervene, it "may not obstruct the settlement and force a qui 
tam plaintiff to continue litigation," but it may obtain a hearing to "question the 
settlement for good cause," as where "a qui tam plaintiff and defendant ... artificially 
structur[e] a settlement to deny the government its proper share of the settlement 
proceeds"); Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (holding 
that § 3730(b)(l) "applies only in cases where a plaintiff seeks voluntary dismissal of a 
claim or action ... and not where the court orders dismissal"). 
120. Section 3730(b)(l)'s requirement of written consent by both the court and the 
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V.lhen one looks only to the ways in which the federal 
government's control over a qui tam action can safeguard a 
state's interests, the rights granted to the United States when it 
chooses not to intervene in the action are somewhat more 
lin1ited; but they are nonetheless significant. The United States 
can seek dismissal of the action over the objection of the qui tam 
relator, though only after the relator receives notice and a 
hearing on the government's motion to dismiss.l21 This 
provision for judicial review may render the United States' 
Attorney General theore tically might help to prevent a vexatious qui tam plaintiff from 
dismissing and then refiling litigation for improper purposes. Rule 41 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides similar protection, but may not apply to a dismissal of 
a qui tam action. See FED. R. Crv . P . 41(a) (after defendant's service of either an answer 
or a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff may dismiss its claims only by leave of 
comt or by stipulation signed by all parties that have appeared); FED. R. Crv. P. 41(a)(1) 
(provisions for dismissal by stipulation are "[s]ubject to the provisions of ... any statute 
of the United States"); cf United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece 
Packing Corp., 151 F .3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998) (in False Claims Act qui tam suit, 
Rule 41-which "protects defendants from vexatious plaintiffs"-does not apply to "the 
dismissal decision of the real party in interest, the government, under a specific statute 
establishing unique relationships among the parties"), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 794 (1999). 
121. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (1994). There is some question as to whether § 
3730(c)(2) applies to actions in which the United States chooses not to intervene, since 
that provision specifies limitations on the rights of the qui tam relator in the event that 
the United States does intervene. See id. § 3730(c)(1) ("If the Government proceeds with 
the action" the qui tam relator "shall h ave the right to continue as a party to the action, 
subject to the lin1itations set forth in paragraph (2)."). By contrast, if the United States 
elects not to intervene initially, the Act provides that the court may "permit the 
Government to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause" but such 
permission must not "limit[] the status and rights of the person initiating the action." 
Id. § 3730(c)(3). 
Arguably, since "it would severely 'limit the status and rights' of the qui tam 
relator if the DOJ later intervened and dismissed or settled the suit .. . unless the DOJ 
initially intervenes during the 60-day period, it loses all power to dismiss or settle the 
suit ... . " James T. Blanch, Note, The Constitutionality of the False Claims Act's Qui 
Tam Provision, 16 HA.Rv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 701, 708 (1993). One court, however, has 
reasoned that to "assume that the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act were 
intended to curtail the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General" would "raise 
serious constitutional questions." Juliano v. Federal Asset Disposition Ass'n, 736 F. 
Supp. 348, 351 (D.D.C. 1990), affd mem., 959 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that 
the United States could move for dismissal of some of a qui tam relator's claims at the 
outset of the litigation without first seeking to intervene in the action); see also United 
States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 753 n.10 (9th Cir. 1993) (approving the 
Juliano Court's interpretation as "an illustration of the meaningful control which the 
Executive Branch can exercise over qui tam actions"). The same analysis should apply 
to allow the United States to seek dismissal at a later time, rather than at the start of 
the litigation. Thus, the United States, as intervenor, has been allowed to seek 
dismissal of a qui tam suit under § 3730(c)(2)(A), even though the intervention did not 
occur at the outset of the suit. See Sequoia Orange Co., 151 F.3d at 1145 ("Nothing in§ 
3730(c)(2)(A) purports to limit the government's dismissal a uthority based upon the 
manner of intervention."). 
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ability to dismiss qui tam suits somewhat more fz;rm al, and 
perhaps less suited to the accommodation of political concerns, 
than the Court envisioned 'Nhen it wrote of suits "under the 
control of responsible federal officers."122 On the other hand, it 
appears unlikely that cour ts will require more than a rational 
basis for the government's motion to dismiss. 123 Likewise, the 
requirement that the court hold a fairness hearing on any 
settlement entered into by the government over the objections of 
the relator should not prove too daunting an obstacle, especially 
since the hearing may be he1d in camera if necessa:ry.124 On 
balance, then, the structure of qui tam suits unde:r the F alse 
Claims Act may provide the United States with sufficient 
control that the conduct of the suits "Will not be guided solely by 
the private interests of the relator, untempered by political 
accountability. 
However, the ability to implement policies based on political 
accountability may mean little if the accountability itself never 
materializes. VVhile the United States likely can exercise 
significant influence in favor of the state defendant in a qui ta m 
suit, it is less apparent that the United States >Nill have a 
motive to do so. Although the United States is a nominal 
plaintiff in such a suit, it can potentially- if it chooses not to 
intervene-disclaim responsibility for the relator's actions in 
bringing and maintaining the suit. 125 At least in the minds of 
members of the public at large, the government is less likely to 
seem responsible for failing to put a stop to a qui tam suit by a 
private individual than for bringing suit itself. Likewise, some 
have argued that the absence of the federal government from 
qui tam suits "prevents congresspersons from fulfilling their 
122. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 785 (1991). 
123. See United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 
F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Sequoia Orange Co. , 151 F.3d at 1145, for 
proposition that "in light of Separation of Powers concerns, district court need find only 
that the government's decision to dismiss a qui tam suit, even a meritorious one, is 
supported by a 'valid governmental purpose' that is not arbitrary or irrational and has 
some 'rational relation' to the dismissal"); but see Stevens, 162 F.3d at 223 (Weinstein, J., 
dissenting) (referring to a case "in which qui tam provisions permitted a relator to force a 
suit that the Department of Justice would have chosen not to pursue if the exercise of its 
prosecutorial discretion had not been undermined"). 
124. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B) (1994) (government may settle over relator's 
objections "if the court determines, after a hearing, that the proposed settlement is fair , 
adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances"). 
125. See United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 
870, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (arguing that qui tam arrangement would permit the United 
States to "remov[e] itself from direct accountability" for the suit). 
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the cooperative relationships betvveen state agencies and thei:r 
federal counterparts. "126 In this view, by allowing suits to 
proceed in the absence of the federal government, the qui tam 
system "effectively sh ort circuits the moderating processes 
afforded eong-.resspersons and state and :federal 
,., dmi 'riJ. s +-ra·h T<'" ;' 127 0~ .t - . ... u.. . i,..J_ !.1 \.. - u. 
Finally, qui tarn suits are by nature antithetical to Alden's 
goal of forcing the government to set priorities among its claims 
against states. As the Court is well aware, the United States 
lacks the resm.u'Ces to htigate every state violation of a federal 
r ight .128 Th us, the United States' decision to litigate a particular 
claim reflects, in the view of the Alden Court, a determination 
that the case is important enough, compared to other potential 
litigation, to vvarrant action by the federal government. 129 The 
qu~ tam suit, by cont rast, serves the opposite goal, 130 for it 
126_ Stevens, 162 F .3d at 219 (Weinstein, J., dissenting)_ 
127. Id. at 225; see also id. (arguing that the "process by which federal 
representatives seek to influence the administrative discretion of the executive branch 
on behalf of their constituents, sometimes described as 'casework,' has become an 
integral part of American federalism")_ The force of this argument is open to question; 
Professor Caminker challenges Judge Weinstein's analysis as "highly speculative." 
Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 123-24 (noting that "[s]tates (and 
th eir congressional representatives) do sometimes influence federal regulatory policy," 
but arguing that "escaping from erstwhile legal liability [is] a more dubious prospect"). 
128. See, e.g, Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2292-93 (1999) (Souter, J., joined by 
Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Night and Day: 
Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in 
Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1, 14 (1998) ("In a world of limited 
governmental resources," to require that only the United States can sue states for 
violations of federal law "means that some significant portion of such violations will go 
uncorrected."); cf, e.g., Employees of Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of 
Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 297 n.12 (1973) (Marshall, J., joined by Stewart, 
J., concurring in result) (noting that "[i]t is obviously unrealistic to expect Government 
enforcement alone to be sufficient" to implement the provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act). 
129. Even if the Court is correct that such prioritization by the United States will 
generally lead the government to sue on the most important claims, presumably in some 
instances a rule against suits by private qui tam relators will lead to underenforcement. 
See Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 120 n. 128 (noting that 
"[t]here might be some suits that only a private relator but not an executive official 
would pursue (for example, wh ere the suit seems meritorious but the gains too small to 
justifY the deployment of scarce public resources)"); id. at 122 ("Congress's rationale for 
revitalizing the False Claims Act's qui tam provisions was that the executive branch by 
itself was underenforcing federal law because it lacked the resources to detect violations 
or prosecute them once detected."). 
130. See United States ex re l. Milam v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer 
Ctr. , 961 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 1992) (by providing for qui tam suits , Congress "gave the 
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enables private parties to prosecute claims th::-rt th·2 g·Dve:rn'Xtf,nt 
conclud:2s it lacks th e resources or the desire to press itseJf l:E 
~ d ' • J:' th . - . 1- • nc . ' • k " t t 1 . r-l n eed, 11 1 e qw tam plmn· ..,nl 1s lL e an a o:rney w oTKln g :wr a 
contingent fee,"132 she seems to be a lawyer withou t a client. 13:3 
Unlike a client, the United States is not a party to the qui tarn 
suit, and thus is subject neither to the discovery rules governin;::;· 
parties, 134 n or to the disciplinary author ity of the court, nor tc1 
,., .1 .. .c 4 t) ' f" ls- I .Ll • nam n.y 10T cos,~s or a· c.orneys· rees. ;:) . n surn , ~.,ne quL tam 
provisions give the United States many of the benefit s of 
bringing a claim while permit ting it to evade th e bun1ens and 
r espon sibilit ies of litigation. 
Th us, qui tam suits against states in which th e United 
States chooses not to intervene fall close to the line sketched bv . . ; 
Executive Branch the option to allocate its resources elsewh ere") . 
131. A requirement that the United States itself press the claim would, of course, 
decrease dramatically the absolute number of damages suits brought against states. 
Presumably, this effect is not in itself a functional justification for the Alden Court's 
rule. See Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 120 (noting that "an 
executive form requirement cannot persuasively be justified merely because it would 
likely lead to fewer suits being filed against states"). To the members of the Alden 
majority, however, such an effect might accord with an originalist view of the stat es' 
consent, in the constitutional plan, to suit by the United States. If the Court adheres t o 
the view that this consent arose from the desire to avoid federal r esort to "extralegal 
measures ," Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 , then the Court might also posit that the sta tes 
consented to such suits only to the extent necessary to avoid armed conflicts with th e 
United States-a limitation that might map fairly closely onto the small subset of 
United States claims that the federal government elects to litigate itself. 
132. United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 
F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1998). 
133. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, while "an attorney owes important fiduciary 
duties to his client," no such duty "prevents the qui tam plaintiff from furthering his own 
interests to the detriment of the United States' interests." United States ex rel. Foulds v. 
Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 290 n.18. (5th Cir. 1999). 
134. See United States ex rel. Farrell v. SKF, USA, Inc., 32 F. Supp.2d 617, 617-19 
(W.D.N.Y. 1999) (in qui tam suit in which United States has chosen not to intervene, 
United States is not "a litigating party subject to the discovery rules"). As a practical 
matter, the United States' absence may not always disadvantage the defendant in terms 
of discovery. See John T. Boese, The Science and Art of Defending a Civil False Claims 
Act Case Brought by a Qui Tam Relator, A.B.A. WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1997, N97WCCB 
ABA-LGLED I-1, at *I-15 (1997) (arguing that if the United States chooses not to 
intervene, defense counsel can seek information from the United States through 
informal discovery methods that "are an enormous source of cheaper, easier and many 
times far more useful discovery than formal depositions") . 
135. See United States ex rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154 F.3d 865, 869 (8th Cir. 
1998) (Panner, J., dissenting) ("Unless it intervenes, the United States is not liable for 
any costs or attorney fees awarded to the defendants."); cf 31 U.S.C. § 3730(g) (1994) 
("In civil actions brought under this section by the United States, the provisions of 
section 2412(d) of title 28 shall apply."); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1994) (providing that in a 
civil action brought by or against the United States a "prevailing party" may, if it meet s 
certain requirements, recover "fees and other expenses" from the United States). 
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the Alden Court aroun.d state sovereign immunity. To be sure, 
such suits arise from injury to, and seek recovery for, t h e United 
States, and the governm ent retains some degree of control over 
their conduct. But such suits conspicuously violate the Alden 
Court's rule "that the National Government must itself deem 
the case of sufficient importance to take action against th e 
State."136 By contrast, Arizona intervention-as will become 
clear from the description that follows-suffers from no such 
defect. 
III .ARIZONA AND SUBSEQUENT CASES 
In approving the tribal litigants' intervention in _Arizona v. 
California, 137 the Court did not discuss whether the Constitution 
requires that the United States retain any particular degree of 
influence or control over the prosecution of the claims against 
the states. However, Arizona's facts , procedural history and 
holding indicate that tribal intervention does not offend state 
immunity, even wher e the tribal litigant makes different 
arguments, and seeks more extensive relief, than does the 
United States. In this section, I summarize relevant aspects of 
the Arizona case, and then examine whether Arizona's holding 
is still good law. 
A. Arizona 
The Arizona litigation began in 1952 when Arizona brought 
an original proceeding against California in the Supreme Court 
to confirm Arizona's title to, and limit California's use of, the 
waters of the lower Colorado River.l38 Nevada intervened to 
seek a determination of its water rights, and Utah and New 
Mexico were joined as defendants.l39 The United States then 
intervened to assert water rights on behalf of various federal 
"establishments," including the reservations of five Indian tribes 
(the "Tribes") .140 
136. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269; see also Foulds, 171 F.3d at 293-94 ("Unless the 
United States commits its own resources-both personnel and money that are under its 
authority and control-private citizens should not be able to sidestep the Eleventh 
Amendment and hail the sovereign states into federal court."). 
137. 460 U.S. 605 (1983). 
138. See id. at 608. 
139. See id. 
140. Id. at 608-09. 
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and supplemented in 1979,143 the Sup-reme Court created a 
system to alloca te water rights among the litigants. The decrees 
apportioned certain amounts of water to each of Arizona, 
California and Nevada and required the United Sta tes, which 
controlled the flow of water in the relevant portion of the 
Colorado River, to follow a particular order of priority in 
distributing it.l44 In the event of a water shortage, the United 
States was required to provide the five Tribes with their full 
annual allotment of water before providing water to the three 
states. 145 
Prior to the entry of the 1979 decree, the Tribes moved to 
intervene to assert new claims to additional water righ ts 
appurtenant t o lands they claimed should be counted as part of 
their respective reservations.l46 Not only had the United States 
not asserted those claims, but it even initially opposed the 
Tribes' intervention- though it eventually joined the Tribes in 
claiming additional water rights.l47 Ivieanwhile, the Court in 
1979 disposed of all the other issues in the case and referred th e 
int ervention motions148 to a Special Master.149 
By the time that the Special Master ruled on the Tribes' 
141. See Arizona v. California, 376 U.S . 340 (1964). 
142. See Arizona v. California, 383 U.S. 268 (1966). 
143. See Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979). 
144. See Arizona, 376 U.S. at 340-46. 
145. See Arizona v. California, 460 U .S. 605, 611 (1983). The 1979 decree 
enumerated a limited number of specific properties in Arizona and California, the water 
rights of which could be satisfied before those of the Tribes. See Arizona, 439 U.S. at 
421. 
146. See Arizona, 460 U .S. at 612. 
147. See id. 
148. Three of the Tribes had also sought to intervene to oppose entry of the Court's 
1979 decree setting the order of priority of the water rights; the Court refused to grant 
them leave to intervene for this purpose. See id. Since the parties had been litigating 
the order of priority since the late 1960s, see, e.g. , Arizona, 439 U .S. at 424 n.3 
(discussing Arizona's 1967 submission), and the intervention motion was not made until 
1977 at the earliest, see 460 U.S. at 612, it seems likely that the Court's refusal to grant 
intervention as to the subject matter of the 1979 decree stemmed from the belated 
nature of the application. See Arizona, 460 U.S. at 615 (granting motions to intervene 
with respect to new issues because "[t)he Tribes' motions to intervene are sufficiently 
timely with respect to this phase of the litigation" (emphasis added)); cf FED. R. Crv. P. 
24 (requiring that applications to intervene in district court proceedings be "timely"); 
Arizona, 460 U.S. at 614 (noting that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a 
guide to procedure in original actions before the Court). 
149. Special Master Elbert P . Tuttle had been appointed to the federal bench in 
1954. At the time of his involvement in the Arizona case he was a Senior Circuit Judge 
on the Fifth Circuit-and then the Eleventh Circuit-Court of Appeals. 
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nwtions to intervene, "[t}he only substantive 1ssue pendin g in 
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which depen d the present perfected righ ts of -which the Tribes 
are the beneficial owners."150 The states vigorously opposed 
inte.i:vention, contending that the Tribes' interests were 
adequately represented by the United States151 an d th at t r ibal 
intervention without the states' consent would violate their 
Eleventh Amendment ixnmunityJ52 
The Special Master rejected some of the Tribes' arguments 
as to the inadequacy of the United States' represent ation,l53 
reasoning that the Unit ed States could not be held to the same 
conflicts standar ds as an ordinary fiducia:ry.154 But the Special 
Iv'Iaster nonetheless found significant differences between the 
Tr ibes' interests and those of the United States, most 
importantly that "in their pleadings, the United St a tes and the 
Tribes claim significantly different amounts of irrigable 
acreage," with the result that "[t] o the extent of these differences 
the Indian claims are not actually r epresented" by the United 
States.155 More generally, the Special Mast er r easoned that "[i] n 
its representation of the Tribes , though it must reasonably fulfill 
the nation's trust obligations or face the prospect of liability for 
their breach, the United States also acts on considerations of 
Indian policy or other national concerns which may yield a 
different litigation position than the r epresented Tribes 
themselves would reach."156 Finally, although the Special 
150. Mem. and Report on Prelim. Issues [hereinafter Special Master Report] at 6-7, 
Arizona (Aug. 28, 1979). 
151. See id at 8. Arizona opposed any sort of tribal intervention whatsoever, see id.; 
California, Nevada and Utah were willing to consent to intervention only on certain 
conditions, including that the tribes be represented only by their own counsel and no 
longer by the United States, and that the tribes be allowed to assert only certain kinds of 
claims (those for water rights appurtenant to acreage outside the reservation boundaries 
as conceded by the United States for purposes of the 1964 decree) and not other kinds of 
claims (those for acreage within the boundaries conceded for the 1964 decree but not 
claimed by the United States prior to the 1964 decree), see id. at 2, 18. 
152. See id. at 18. 
153. The Tribes contended that the United States had conflicted loyalties springing 
from its interests on behalf of other federal establishments and its involvement in the 
management of the river system; moreover, they pointed out that the United States had 
already failed the Tribes by omitting to present initially the claims which the Tribes now 
sought to assert. The Special Master rejected these arguments on the basis that, 
whatever may have gone before, they did not raise concerns as to the United States' 
current ability to discharge its duties to the Tribes. See id. at 9-10. 
154. See generally id. at 10 n.18. 
155. Id. at 11. 
156. Special Master Report, supra note 150, at 11-12 (footnotes omitted). 
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he held that the .Amendment was no bar to intervention by the 
Tribes .158 
Not surprisingly, the exceptions filed by the states in the 
Supreme Court included an objection to the Tribes' intervention. 
'I'hc '"o,.. .. -~ l-.~~ve-ver upheld t 11e cr-,.a··l.J.. of in;·e.,.,..verl'-ion sta.J..1'ng l-~ 'V d- v, 1~\J V l '-' i 0 1 1 L ~ L J. '· . la A ~ , v l, 
t hat because "[t]he Tribes do not seek to bring new claims or 
issues against the states, but only ask leave t o participate in an 
adjudication of their vital water rights that was commenced by 
the United States ," the Court's "judicial power over the 
controversy is not enlar ged by granting leave to intervene, and 
the States' sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh 
Amendment is not compromised."159 
The Court's terse holding is illuminated perhaps less by its 
words than by what went unsaid, for the Court eschewed each of 
the Special lVIaster's three rationales. First, the Court, unlike 
the Special Master, 160 did not invoke the concept that the Tribes' 
claims were "ancillary" to the main proceeding before it. Indeed, 
such a view would have run contrary to the Court's own 
assessment of the case, which made clear that the proceeding in 
which the Tribes sought to intervene was new, self-contained, 
and separate from the previously-resolved disputes: 
The 1979 Decree . .. resolved outstanding issues in the litigation. 
But before that Decree was entered new questions arose: The five 
Indian Tribes, ultimately joined by the United States, made claims 
for additional water rights to Reservation lands. 161 
The Court may also have found the ancillary jurisdiction 
rationale doctrinally unpersuasive. Only a year later, in 
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 162 it would 
hold that pendent jurisdiction did not override the Eleventh 
157. Id. at 17; see also id. n.30. 
158. See id. at 16-30. 
159. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614 (1983). The Court, like the Special 
Master, assumed for the sake of argument "that a State may interpose its immunity to 
bar a suit brought against it by an Indian tribe." Id. 
160. The Special Master maintained that because the Tribes' "claims as intervenors 
are ancillary to a case or controversy ... within the federal judicial power and already 
before the Court," intervention "is therefore within the scope of the States' constitutional 
surrender of immunity." Special Master Report, supra note 150, at 18; see also id. at 20-
24. 
161. Arizona, 460 U.S. at 611. 
162. 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
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.f-\_mendment with respect to state-law claims.163 
Second, the Court rightly ignored the Special Iviaster's 
argument that the relief sought by the Tribes would :not "run 
against th e States,"164 for such plainly was not the case. Since 
the Tribes' allocations were the first to be fulfill ed in the event of 
a vvater sh ortage, the increased water rights won by the Tribes 
operated directly to decrease the water rights of the states-
:rights that those states had asserted throughout decades of 
litigation. Admittedly, the relief sought by the Tribes would not 
necessarily alter the allocation of water among the states; but it 
would "require a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount of 
water available" to states and other non-Indian users as a 
group.l65 Third, the Court disregarded the Special Master's 
argument that Congress had abrogated the states' immunity in 
enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1362166-a rationale that the Court would 
later reject in Blatchford.l67 
The Court's holding, moreover, is informed not only by the 
arguments the Court rej ected but also by the facts of which it 
must have been aware. The Special Master's Preliminary 
Report made clear that the Tribes sought greater relief than did 
the United States168-indeed, that conclusion was among the 
primary reasons the Special Master permitted the Tribes to 
intervene.169 The Special Master, however, viewed the Tribes 
not as "rais[ing] new claims," but rather as seeking merely "to 
163. See id. at 121. 
164. The Special Master wrote that "[t]he Tribes do not now seek to present new 
claims against the States which will alter the allocation of water among the States as 
determined by the Supreme Court .. . nor do they seek relief which will run against the 
States." Special Master Report, supra note 150, at 19. 
165. Arizona v. Califomia, 460 U.S. 605, 621 (1983). 
166. See Special Master Report, supra note 150, at 25-30. Section 1362, which 
provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, 
brought by any [federally recognized] Indian tribe or band .. . wherein the matter in 
controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," 28 
U.S.C. § 1362 (1994), was intended "to open the federal courts to the kind of claims that 
could have been brought by the United States as trustee, but for whatever reason were 
not so brought," Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 472 
(1976). 
167. See Blatchford v. Native Village ofNoatak, 501 U.S. 775, 788 (1991). 
168. See Special Master Report, supra note 150, at 11. The extent of the Tribes' 
water rights depended on the irrigable acreage within their reservations. The Special 
Master specifically noted that "[w]ith one exception, the total irrigable acreage which the 
United States claims for each reservation ... differs significantly from that claimed by 
the Tribes on their own behalfs," in all but one instance because the Tribes claimed 
greater acreage than did the United States. Id. at 3 & n.6. 
169. See id. at 11. 
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quantify existing rights already presented by the United States 
and determined by the Court."170 Hence when the Court 
adopted the view that the Tribes did not seek to bring "new 
claims or issues" against the states, it was not referring to an 
absence of quantitative differences in the relief requested. 
Thus, Arizona demonstrates that Indian t ribes can 
intervene in actions litigated by the United States-without 
offending st ate sovereign immunity-even if the tribes seek 
relief that is quantitatively more extensive than that requested 
by the United States. 
B. Later Cases 
Despite its recent flurry of decisions favoring state 
sovereign immunity, the Court has not retreated from its 
h olding in Arizona. In particular, the Court's decisions in 
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman 171 and in 
Idaho u. Coeur d'Alene Tribe 172 do not affect the Arizona 
doctrine; and though the Court's recent decision in Jldinnesota u. 
Mille Lacs Band173 provided an opportunity to revisit Arizona, 
the Court did not do so. 
Though at first glance the Court's discussion in Pennhurst 
of pendent jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment might 
seem relevant to Arizona intervention, closer inspection shows 
Pennhurst to be inapposite. In Pennhurst, the Court held that 
pendent jurisdiction cannot override a state's Eleventh 
Amendment immunity with respect to an individual's state-law 
claim, and that therefore the Eleventh Amendment barred the 
award of injunctive relief to private plaintiffs, under a state law, 
against state officials.174 The Court explained that "[a] federal 
court must examine each claim in a case to see if the court's 
jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment"175 and noted that "[a]lthough the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar the United States from suing a State 
in federal court, the United States' presence in the case for any 
purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all 
170. Id. at 13. 
171. 465 u.s. 89 (1984). 
172. 521 u.s. 261 (1997). 
173. 119 S. Ct. 1187 (1999). 
174. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 124-25. 
175. Id. at 121. 
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purposes."176 Thus, although the United States had intervened 
as a plaintiff,177 the Court held that because the United States 
lacked standing "to assert the state-law claims of third-parties" 
its presence did not affect the application of the Eleventh 
Amendment to such claims.17s 
Pennhurst's holding has no bearing on Arizona, for the 
Court in Arizona did not rely on the concept that the proceeding 
in question was ancillary to the litigation that had gone 
before.179 Moreover, the United States clearly has standing to 
assert federal claims on behalf of Indian tribes pursuant to its 
trust obligations,180 and thus the Pennhurst scenario-where the 
United States had no standing to assert individuals' state-law 
claims-has no application. l SI 
Similarly, nothing in Coeur d'Alene Tribe undermines 
Arizona. In Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the Court held that the 
Eleventh Amendment barred the Tribe's claims for declaratory 
and injunctive relief against state officials concerning the Tribe's 
asserted beneficial interest in certain lands and waters.182 Mter 
the district court dismissed the Tribe's claims, the United States 
filed a separate suit against the state on the Tribe's behalf, 
seeking to quiet title to about a third of the land at issue in the 
Tribe's action.183 None of the parties contended, and the Court 
did not suggest, that the United States' separate and 
subsequent suit had any relevance to the sovereign immunity 
question before the Court; indeed, the Court noted that the 
government's suit was "not implicated" in the case before it.l84 
Though a closer question might have been presented had the 
176. Id. at 103 n.12 (citation omitted). 
177. See id. at 96 n.5. 
178. Id. at 103 n.12. 
179. See Part liLA. above. 
180. See Part IV.A.2. below. 
181. Thus, the holding of Pennhurst belies the D.C. Circuit's suggestion in United 
States ex rel. Long u. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 885 (D.C. Cir. 
1999), that under Pennhurst states retain their sovereign immunity to a private 
plaintiffs federal claim even if the United States intervenes to assert the same claim. 
See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, Nos. 80-CV-930 & 80-CV-960, 1999 WL 509442, at 
*14 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 1999) (holding that Arizona, and not Pennhurst, applies where the 
United States has intervened and "is seeking to enforce the [tribal plaintiffs'] federal 
rights") . 
182. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 264-65, 287-88. 
183. See id. at 266. 
184. ld.; see also Petitioner's Brief at 6-7, Coeur d'Alene Tribe (1996 WL 290997); 
Respondent's Brief at 4, Coeur d'Alene Tribe (1996 WL 380391); Reply Brief at 10-11, 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe (1996 WL 439249). 
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Tr ibe sought to consolidate its case with the government's 
action, it had no such opportunity in Coeur d'Alene Tribe since 
the government did not sue until after the Tribe's suit was 
dismissed. Thus, Coeur d'Alene Tribe, at most, indicates an 
unwillingness to extend the Arizona rationale beyond claims 
brought in the same suit by a tribe and the fede ral governmen t. 
Likewise, the Court could have revisited the Arizona issu e 
in Mille Lacs Band, but it chose not to. In Mille Lacs Band , the 
Eighth Circuit held under Arizona that the United States' 
presence as a plaintiff-intervenor removed any st ate sovereign 
immunity to the Mille Lacs Band's claims. 185 Mter the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari, the state defendant s br iefed the 
certified issues but did not question the lower courts' h oldings 
on state sovereign immunity.l86 Similarly, no mention was 
made of state sovereign immunity at oral argumentl87 and the 
issue is absent from both the opinion for the Courtl88 and the 
dissent.l89 Admittedly, the Court's affirmance of the judgment 
in favor of the plaintiffs does not indicate that it considered the 
Eleventh Amendment issue, for under Wisconsin Department of 
Corrections v. Schacht190 if a state neglects to press its Eleventh 
Amendment defense a court need not raise the defect on its 
own. 191 Nonetheless, since a court can raise an Eleventh 
Amendment issue sua sponte if it chooses, 192 the Court's silence 
185. See Mille Lacs Band v. Minnesota, 124 F.3d 904, 913-14 (8th Cir. 1997), affd 
on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 1187 (1999). 
186. See Brief for the Petitioners, Mille Lacs Band (1998 WL 464932); Reply Brief 
for the Petitioners, Mille Lacs Band (1998 WL 761906). The County defendants and an 
amicus each submitted a brief obliquely criticizing Eleventh Amendment rulings by the 
lower courts. See Brief of Respondent Counties in Support of Petitioner State of 
Minnesota at 18, Mille Lacs Band (1998 WL 464930) ("The court's order enjoining the 
State from enforcement of its conservation laws while requiring the State to restrict 
other citizens is beyond a court's jurisdiction (and relief barred by the lOth and 11th 
Amendments)."); Brief for the Citizens Equal Rights Alliance (CERA) as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners at 8, Mille Lacs Band (1998 WL 464928) ("Based on an original 
jurisdiction decision, the Judge relied on an 1837 Treaty to defeat Eleventh Amendment 
defenses to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."). However, neither brief highlighted the 
issue. 
187. See Transcript, Mille Lacs Band (1998 WL 849395). 
188. See 119 S. Ct. 1187. 
189. See id. at 1206 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., 
dissenting). 
190. 118 S. Ct. 204 7 (1998) . 
191. See id. at 2052. 
192. See, e.g., Parella v. Retirement Bd., 173 F.3d 46, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1999); V-1 Oil 
Co. v. Utah State Dep't of Public Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1420 (lOth Cir. 1997); Ysleta Del 
Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1994). Although the Seventh Circuit 
has stated that Schacht "ruled that a federal court must not raise a potential Eleventh 
2000 RAISII\fG A.RIZONA 141 
suggests that it continues to adh ere to the holding in Arizona . 
In sum, the Court's recent decisions h ave not questioned the 
propriety of Arizona int ervention; but neither h ave they 
commented upon it. Thus, further inquiTy into the Cov.rt's likely 
view of the doctr ine must draw upon the Court's m ore gener al 
approaches to st ate sovereign immunity. In this regard, t he 
A lde n majority's focus on the nature of the pla intiff seems 
particularly pertinent. 
IV . .A...RIZONA IN THE LIGHT OF A L DEN 
As noted above, the Court's recent formulation of the 
concerns underlying state sovereign immunity may prompt a 
reevaluation of certain types of suits, such as qui tam actions in 
which th e United Sta tes does not intervene. But far from 
bringing A rizona intervent ion into question , A lden's for mal 
approach and its functional an alysis provide support for tribal 
par ticipation in United States suits against stat es . 
A. Arizona and the Formal Federalism Inquiry 
The terseness of the A rizona opinion perhaps r eflected the 
fact that the question of intervention by Indian t r ibes in federal 
government suits against states is nowhere directly addressed 
in the sources to which the Court customarily turns for guidance 
on issues of feder alism. 193 Thus , the discussion that follows does 
not address all the sour ces on which the Alden Court dr ew for 
its formal analysis, for some of those-for instance English legal 
precedents, and statements by the Framers and their 
contemporaries-have no direct relevance to Arizona 
intervention. Of the remaining topics treated in Alden's formal 
analysis, the Court's emphasis on state dignity, and its focus on 
historical practices, seem most r elevant, and inquir ies along 
Amendment issue sua sponte," Schacht v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 175 F.3d 497, 
501 (7th Cir. 1999), nothing in S chacht supports such a reading, see, e.g., Schacht, 118 S. 
Ct . at 2052 ("Unless the State raises the matter, a court can ignore it" (emphasis 
added).)_ 
193. Although the colonial era provided some precedent for the relationship among 
the new federal government, the states and the Indian t ribes, see, e.g., Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U .S. 515, 547-48 (1832) (discussing the Regal Proclamation of Oct. 7, 1763, 
which provided that colonial governors could not grant patents to Indian la nds without 
the Crown's approval); see generally Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce 
Clause , 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1064-98 (1995) (discussing colonial interactions with 
Indian tribes), the traditional sources of federalism precepts are silent on the part icular 
question of Arizona intervention. 
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those lines indicate that Arizona is doctrinally sound. 
1. State "dignity" and tribal suits 
The Alden Court's recurrent references to state "dign.ity"194 
suggest that such a concept would figure in the Court's analysis 
of t:cibal participation in suits by the United States. As an 
initial matter, however, the question arises whether a concern 
:for state "dignity" remains a valid consideration in state 
sove:ceig-n immunity analysis . An abstract conception of state 
dignity seems a hollmv basis for denying redress for state 
violations of federal law; as the Alden dissenters argued, "[i]t 
would be hard to imagine anything more inimical to the 
republican conception, which rests on the understanding of its 
citizens precisely that the government is not above them, but of 
them, its actions being governed by law just like their own."195 
The Alden majority, though, appears to regard state "dignity'' as 
a way of conceptualizing the reservation of certain rights and 
powers to the states. Dignity, in this perspective, is the 
t ouchst one of the states' residuary sovereignty: "[t]hey are not 
194. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2247 (1999) (states retain "a substantial 
portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential 
attributes inhering in that status"); id. (states "retain the dignity, though not the full 
authority, of sovereignty"); id. (Framers "considered immunity from private suits central 
to sovereign dignity"); id. at 2258 (a sovereign's immunity from suit in court of another 
sovereign must arise either from an agreement between the two sovereigns, "or in the 
voluntary decision of the second to respect the dignity of the first" (quoting Nevada v. 
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416 (1979))); id. at 2263 (sovereign immunity is designed to protect 
"the dignity and respect afforded a State" (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 
U.S. 261, 268 (1997))); id. at 2264 (discussing petitioners' contention "that immunity 
from suit in federal court suffices to preserve the dignity of the States"); id. ("Private 
suits against nonconsenting States ... present 'the indignity of subjecting a State to the 
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties"' (quoting Ex parte 
Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).). 
195. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2289 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, 
JJ., dissenting); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The Sovereign Immunity 
"Exception," 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 132 (1996) (questioning the viability of the dignity 
rationale since "(t]he idea that a state, an utterly abstract entity, has feelings about 
being sued by a private party ... surely strains credulity," and noting that the Court has 
elsewhere ruled "that states serve as functional entities in the constitutional context") 
(quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) ("The Constitution does 
not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as 
abstract political entities . . . . To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority 
between federal and state government for the protection of individuals.")). 
As well, one would think that those who favor rules over standards might 
object to the Court's emphasis on the "dignity" of states as a basis for state immunity, 
since such a concept seems so vague as to set no constraint on ad hoc decisionmaking. 
Cf Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
rules are necessary to guard against ad hoc judgment). 
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relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, 
but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of 
sovereignty."196 According to this view, the Court must honor 
the Framers' references to state dignity by preserving certain 
state prerogatives;197 hence the Alden majority's argument that 
"[t]he generation that designed and adopted our federal system 
considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign 
dignity."198 For the purposes of this Puticle, it is unnecessary to 
decide whether either of these views of state dignity should play 
a :role in sovereign immunity analysis, for tribal participation in 
suit s brought by the United States remains justifiable, whether 
the dignity concept is seen as a proxy for functional goals or as 
an intrinsically important symbolic value. 
Assuming that solicitude for state dignity is meant to 
prevent federal encroachment upon some state prerogatives, 
those prerogatives do not include freedom from suits by the 
United States to enforce federal law. In the view of the Court, 
the states' consent to suit by the United States was necessary in 
order t o ensure the supremacy of federal law199 and to avoid 
196. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2247. Similarly, the Court stated that the Constitution 
"reserves to [the states] a substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, 
together with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status." I d. 
197. See, e.g., id. at 2263 ("[O]ur federalism requires that Congress treat the States 
in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants 
in the governance of the Nation."). 
198. Id. at 2247. Likewise, the Court appears to see state dignity as a protection 
against federal commandeering: state courts should not be forced to hear federal claims 
pressed by private plaintiffs against states, the Alden Court held, because that would 
"denigrateD the separate sovereignty of the States." Id. at 2264. State dignity may also 
be a shorthand for state autonomy; in arguing that private suits against states would 
interfere with states' public policy decisions, the Alden Court warned of "substantial 
costs to the autonomy, the decisionmaking ability, and the sovereign capacity of the 
States." Id. 
199. The supremacy of federal law requires that, in some respects at least, the 
sovereignty of the states must give way to the will of the federal government, for the 
contrary result would "inver[t] ... the fundamental principles of all government;" to 
have "the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the 
parts" would create "a monster, in which the head was under the direction of the 
members." THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 99 (Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
Thus, "[t]he possibility of suits by the United States against the states is 
essential to our federal system .... 'Unless this power were given to the United States, 
the enforcement of all their rights, powers, contracts and privileges in all their sovereign 
capacity would be at the mercy of the states."' United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont 
Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d 195, 213-14 (2d Cir. 1998) (Weinstein, J., 
dissenting) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES§ 1674, at 445 (1851)); see also, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not 
as Limits, but as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1219, 1219-20 (1997) (arguing that 
though one aspect of federalism is "protecting states," "an equally-in fact, more-
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extralegal methods of dispute resolution among the sovereign 
members of the federal system. 200 The Framers "could not have 
overlooked the possibility that controversies capable of judicial 
solution might arise between the United States and some of the 
states," and "the permanence of the Union might be endangered 
if to some t r ibunal was not intrusted the power to determine 
them according to the recognized principles of law."201 
Accordingly, from a function al viewpoint, once a state is sued by 
the federal government, its dignity is not implicated simply 
because in the course of the suit it must also respond to 
allegations by a non-federal intervenor. As the Court has noted, 
"a suit brought against a State by the United States [is] a 
situation in which state sovereign immunity does not exist."202 
Likewise, if the dignity concern is taken as a symbolic 
value, it is no more persuasive, for such a consideration has no 
application to suits by the United States and no resonance in the 
context of suits by Indian tribes. Revealingly, rhetoric 
concerning state dignity has focused instead on suits by private 
individuals. 203 Thus, the Court has argued that "[t]he very 
object and purpose of the eleventh amendment were to prevent 
the indignity of subjecting a state to the coercive process of 
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties."204 As the 
important aspect is protecting authority of the federal government"); cf Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Comment, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARv. L. REV. 102, 122 
(1996) (noting the tension between state sovereign immunity and "national 
supremacy ... which generally presumes that Congress can entrust enforcement of 
whatever rights it can validly create to the national courts"). 
200. For an altemative reconstruction of the intent of the Framers, see Caminker, 
State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 110-11 (discussed supra at note 94). 
201. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644-45 (1892). In Texas, the Court held 
that since the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of suits between two states, it is also an 
appropriate tribunal for suits by the United States against a state. It has since been 
established that the United States can sue a state in the federal district courts, see, e.g., 
United States v. Califomia, 297 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1936). 
202. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. 
Ct. 2219, 2228 n.3 (1999) (citing United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892)). More 
specific functional concems that may arise during such a suit are addressed in Part 
N.B. below. 
203. Similarly, many discussions concerning state sovereign immunity focus 
specifically on suits by private individuals; as Hamilton famously stated, "[i]t is inherent 
in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its 
consent." THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (emphasis added; original emphasis omitted). In this 
regard it is notable that, in surveying background principles of state sovereign 
immunity, the majority opinion in Alden (and its quotes from other sources) referred well 
over a dozen times to "private" suits or suits by "individuals." See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. 
Ct. 2240, 2247-54, 2260-64 (1999). 
204. Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) (holding that the Eleventh 
Amendment applies to a suit against a state attomey general when the state is the real 
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Court has observed, "[t]he generation that designed and adopted 
our system considered immunity from private suits central to 
sovereign dignity."205 During the debates on the Constitution, 
on e of the main objections t o the extension of the judicial power 
to controversies between a state and citizens of another state 
was that "it subjects a state to answer in a court of law, to the 
suit of an individual. This is humiliating and degrading to a 
government, and, what I believe, the supreme authority of no 
state ever submitted to."206 
By contrast, claims brought against a state by the federal 
government do not implicate the symbolic dignity rationale. The 
Court first explicitly addressed the question of such suits in 
United States v. Texas, an original action brought by the federal 
government in the Supreme Court to establish the United 
States' title to certain land claimed by the State of Texas. 207 In 
finding jur isdiction over the action, the Court contrasted suits 
by governments with suits by individuals: 
[Previous cases] in this court relating to the suability of states, 
proceeded upon the broad ground that 'it is inherent in the nature 
of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual 
without its consent.' 
The question as to the suability of one government by another 
government rests upon wholly different grounds. Texas is not 
called to the bar of this court at the suit of an individual, but at 
the suit of the government established for the common and equal 
benefit of the people of all the states.208 
The Court thus focused, not on the state's dignity concerns, 
but on the fact that the constitutional plan must have 
contemplated that the United States could sue states in federal 
court.zog The only mention of state dignity in Texas comes in the 
Court's explanation-of the statute granting the Supreme Court 
exclusive jurisdiction over certain "controversies of a civil nature 
where a state is a party"210-that "it best comported with the 
party in interest); see also, e.g., Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 527-28 (1899) (quoting 
Ayers). 
205. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2247. 
206. "Brutus" XIII, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 222, 223 
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). 
207. 143 U.S. 621, 630-31 (1892). 
208. Id. at 645-46. 
209. See id. at 644-45. 
210. The grant of exclusive jur isdiction applied to "all controversies of a civil nature, 
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dignity of a state that a case in which it was a party should be 
determined in the highest, rather than in a subordinate, judicial 
tribunal of the nation."211 This concern, however, is not of 
constitutional magnitude, and it has since been well established 
that the United States can sue a state in fede:ra1 district court 
without offending the state's dignity.212 
Because the relevant distinction, frorn the perspective of 
symbolic state dignity, is bebNeen suits by individuals and suits 
by governments, tribal suits raise no concerns .213 "Tribes .. . are 
not private citizens, they are sovereig-.L1S. The affront to a state's 
dignity by being hauled into court by another soveTeign is not of 
the same order of magnitude as when the case involves a private 
citizen (if there can be said to be an affront) ."214 Although the 
Court held in Blatchford v. Native Village of f.Toatak th at the 
Eleventh Amendment extends to suits by Indian tribes , it did so 
on the basis that Indian tribes should be treated the same as 
foreign nations for Eleventh Amendment purposes.215 Thus, 
even in establishing state sovereign immunity to certain tribal 
suits, the Court affirmed that "Indian tribes are sovereigns."216 
where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and except also between 
a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original 
but not exclusive jurisdiction." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80. 
211. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643 (1892). 
212. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965) (noting 
surprise "that the District Court entertained seriously the argument that the United 
States could not constitutionally sue a State"); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 
188-89 (1936) (rejecting the argument "that Congress did not intend to subject a 
sovereign state to the inconvenience and loss of dignity involved in a trial in a District 
Court"). 
213. Cf Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 105 (noting that 
"being haled into court by a 'mere' individual arguably poses a starker threat to a state's 
dignity than being haled into court by a coequal or even superior sovereign"). 
214. Beth Prinz, Casenote, Expanding State Sovereignty: Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene 
Tribe of Idaho , 35 IDAHO L. REV. 599, 638 (1999). 
215. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775 (1991). 
216. Id. at 780. Under federal law, Indian tribes remain "unique aggregations 
possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory." 
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 
509 (1991) (noting that Indian tribes "exercise inherent sovereign authority over their 
members and territories"). 
Indeed, the federal government recently reaffirmed its commitment to 
maintaining a "government-to-government" relationship with Indian tribes. See, e.g., 25 
U.S.C . § 3601(1)-(2) (1994) (acknowledging the "government-to-government relationship 
between the United States and each Indian tribe" and stating that the federal 
government's trust responsibility "includes the protection of the sovereignty of each 
tribal government"); White House Press Release, President Clinton: A Record of 
Partnership with American Indians and Alaska Natives (Aug. 6, 1998) (found July 10, 
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The relevant difference betvveen States and foreign 
sovereigns ... is . .. the role of each in the convention within 
which t he surrender of immunity was for the former, but not for 
the latter, implicit. \r{hat m akes the States' surrender of 
immunity from suit by sister States plausible is the mutuality of 
that concession. There is no such mutuality with either foreign 
sovereigns or Indian t ribes. 217 
147 
In Blatchford-as in Monaco u. lVJississippi, 'Where the Court 
held that the Eleventh Amendment applies to suits by foreign 
sovereigns218--the Court made no mention of state dignity, 
indicating that suits by tribal sovereigns implicate no such 
concern.219 
1999 at <http://www.doi .gov/oait/docs/bcl.htm>) (reviewing efforts by the Clinton 
Administration "to establish a true government-to-government partnership" with Indian 
nations); Department of Justice Policy on Indian Sovereignty and GDvernment-to-
Government Relations with Indian Tribes (unsigned, undated version found July 10, 
1999 at <http://w-ww.usdoj.gov/otj/sovtrb.htmb); President's Memorandum for the Heads 
of Executive Departments and Agencies, Government-to-Government Relations with 
Native American Tribal Governments (April 29, 1994) (found July 31, 1999 at 
<http://www.epa.gov/owindian/clinton.htm> ); see also McSloy, supra note 30, at 220 n.16 
(citing earlier examples). 
Moreover, on the same day in 1998 that the President issued an executive 
order on "Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments," see Exec. 
Order No. 13084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (1998), he also issued an executive order on 
"Federalism," see Exec. Order No. 13083, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,651 (1998). The "Federalism" 
order's provisions on federal-state relations parallel the "Consultation" order's precepts 
regarding federal-tribal relations, and the "Consultation" order provides that it "shall 
complement the consultation and waiver provisions in sections 4 and 5 of the Executive 
order, entitled 'Federalism,' being issued on this day." 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 at Sec. 7(c). 
Although in August 1999 the President issued a revised order on "Federalism" that 
revoked Order No. 13083, see Exec. Order No. 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (1999), it is 
suggestive that the two orders, as originally issued, presented the question of federal 
relations with states in tandem with the question of federal relations with tribal 
governments. 
Similarly, though the states frequently dispute the legal implications of tribal 
sovereignty, even they nonetheless acknowledge that it exists. See, e.g., Oregon Exec. 
Order No. E0-96-30, State/Tribal Government-to-Government Relations (May 22, 1996) 
(unsigned version found July 10, 1999 at <http://www.governor.state.or.us/governor/legal 
/execords.htm> ); Jeffrey A. Modisett, Discovering the Impact of the "New Federalism" on 
State Policy Makers: A State Attorney General's Perspective, 32 IND. L. REV. 141, 142 
(1998) (article by Attorney General of Indiana, referring to "the competing sovereignties 
of states, Indian tribes, and the federal government"). 
217. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782. 
218. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934). 
219. Alternatively, the Court's omission to mention state dignity-and the Court's 
application of state sovereign immunity in cases brought by foreign nations and Indian 
tribes-could signal a general decline in the influence of the dignity rationale. Cf 
Caminker, State Immunity Waivers, supra note 15, at 105-06 (discussing Monaco and 
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2. The federal government and Indian t.ribss 
If the abstract notion of t ribal sovereignty helps explain 
why Arizona intervention does not offend state dignity, the 
historical placement of Indian tribes within the federal system 
provides more specific support for the Arizona practice. In this 
respect, the early relations between the federal government and 
I , . ""h d bl . . r- ' ". ' 'l 1 ) 1 ~ tl ncnan tnues are ou y Slgnlncan-c. 11 [TSr , -r;ney snow cna·" ne 
United States immediately assumed a trust responsibility for 
the welfare of the tribes and with it both the ability to enforce 
the tribes' rights against the states and the obligation to afford 
the tribes a voice in the enforcement of those rights. Second, the 
United States' early dealings with Indian tribes help to explain 
why it was not until the 20th century that tribal intervention in 
suits by the federal government became a significant issue. 
"With the adoption of the Constitution, Indian r elations 
became the exclusive province of federal law,"220 and the ne·w 
Nation lost no time in exercising this authority. Under the 
Articles of Confederation, certain states had attempted to 
acquire large amounts of Indian land through "treaties" with 
Indian tribes.221 One of Congress's first acts after the 
Constitution was to pass the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act 
of 1790, one section of which (commonly known as the 
Nonintercourse Act) provides 
[t]hat no sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe 
oflndians within the United States, shall be valid to any person or 
persons, or to any state ... unless the same shall be made and 
duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of 
the United States.222 
Blatchford and arguing that the "dignity-based distinction between individual and 
sovereign plaintiffs has not withstood the test of time; during the past century the court 
has made clear that the background immunity principle covers both categories, and 
immunity waivers fall in both categories as well"). 
220. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985). As the 
Court recently noted, "[i]f anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater 
transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government than does the Interstate 
Commerce Clause:" though the States "still exercise some authority over interstate 
trade[, they] have been divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce and 
Indian tribes." Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996). 
221. At least one circuit court has concluded that the Articles of Confederation did 
not prohibit such treaties. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1167 
(2d Cir. 1988). 
222. Act of July 22, 1790, § 4, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. Chap. 33, 1 Stat. 137, 138. 
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This provJ.slOn and its successo:rs223 reqmre that land 
· · · · .~ T , · ~ ' 1-- l • . t~ d ., P ' l acquiSnwns 1-rom 1.nman ·.,n.ues oe Tan1e oy a rec.era1 treaty 
entered into by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. 224 
From the earliest days of the Union, th e federal 
government's assumption of plenary responsibility for Indian 
relations created a trust relationship between the United States 
and Indian tribes.225 President VVashington explained the 
Nonintercourse Act to a group of Seneca Indians in the following 
terms: 
Here, then, is the security for the remainder of your lands. No 
State, nor person, can purchase your lands, unless at some public 
treaty, held under the authority of the United States. The 
General Government will not consent to your being defrauded, but 
it will protect you in all your just rights. 226 
Decades later, Chief J ustice Marshall would reaffirm the 
United States' trust responsibility to Indian nations: 
From the commencement of our government, congress has passed 
acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which 
treat them as nations , and manifest a firm purpose to afford that 
223. See Act of March 1, 1793, 1 Stat. 329 (renewal); Act of May 19, 1796, 1 Stat. 
469 (renewal); Act ofMarch 3, 1799, 1 Stat. 743 (renewal); Act of March 30, 1802,2 Stat. 
139 (permanent enactment); Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729 (enacting statute in 
substantially its current form), codified as carried forward at 25 U.S. C. § 177. 
224. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 730 F. Supp. 485, 489 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). 
225. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). Of course, to recognize 
the federal government's trust obligations is not to suggest that it always fulfilled them. 
Arguably, the federal trust relationship manifests merely the softer side of the colonizing 
power-the product of"an ambiguous heritage of'a conqueror with a conscience'." Philip 
P. Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal 
Indian Law, llO HA.Rv. L. REV. 1754, 1755 (1997) (quoting Frank Pommersheim, BRAID 
OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 9 (1995)) . 
Moreover, the trust doctrine's effects on Native Americans have sometimes been far from 
benign. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property , 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 
2 (1991) ("The federal government has often justified its coercive interference with the 
property and sovereignty of American Indian nations by claiming to be acting in good 
faith exercise of its trust responsibilities toward American Indians."). The problems 
inherent in the federal trust doctrine, however, are beyond the scope of this Article; and 
as far as the federal structure is concerned, dereliction on the part of the United States 
diminishes neither its duties to Indian tribes nor its powers vis-a-vis the states. 
226. The reply of the President of the United States to the speech of the 
Cornplanter, Half-Town, and Great-Tree, Chiefs and Councillors of the Seneca nation of 
Indians, December 29, 1790, 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 142 (Class II, Indian Affairs) 
(Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832) 
(emphasis added). 
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protection which treaties stipulate. (These acts] manifestly 
consider the several Indian nations as distinct political 
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their 
authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within 
those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied 
by the United St ates. 227 
Clearly, the United States assumed this t:rust responsibility 
in the exercise of its sovereign powers. The Nonintercourse Act, 
one of the federal government's earliest measures to protect the 
rights of Indian tribes, is a law of general application that binds 
the states and explicitly requires that land transactions with 
Indian tribes be made only by federal treaty. Likewise, the 
United States' trust obligations also arise from treaties with the 
Indian tribes, into which the United States entered as a 
sovereign-or rather, as the sovereign, for the United States is 
the only non-native sovereign within this country's borders with 
the constitutional capacity to treat with Indian nations. F inally, 
the federal power to honor the trust includes the power to 
enforce federal law against the states. Thus, for example, in 
United States u. Minnesota,228 when the federal government 
sued Minnesota to cancel patents issued to Minnesota for 
certain tribal lands,229 the Court concluded that "the United 
States has a real and direct interest in the matter 
presented .... [arising] out of its guardianship over the Indians, 
and out of its right to invoke the aid of a court of equity in 
removmg unlawful obstacles to the fulfillment of its 
obligations"230-and held that this interest "is one which 1s 
vested in [the United States] as a sovereign.''23l 
Key among the United States' sovereign responsibilities to 
Indian nations is its duty-and authority-"to do all that [is] 
required ... to prepare the Indians to take their place as 
227. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 556-57 (1832). 
228. 270 U.S. 181 (1926). 
229. See id. at 191-92. 
230. Id. at 193-94; see FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 308 
(2d ed. 1982) (hereinafter FEDERAL INDIAN LAW) (noting courts' view that when the 
United States sues to enforce tribal rights it sues "on its own behalf, as well as on behalf 
of the Indians, to protect its guardianship and to fulfill its trust obligations"). 
231. Minnesota, 270 U.S. at 194; cf Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1, 34 (1911) 
(allowing Virginia to assert a claim on behalf of bondholders among her citizenry, 
because Virginia and West Virginia were both obligated on the debt in question and thus 
West Virginia's agreement to bear an equitable share of the debt was "a contract in the 
performance of which the honor and credit of Virginia is concerned"). 
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in dependent, qualified members of the modern body pohti-:: .":232 
c;o:ncededly, the nation's early policies may not have 
implemented this goal; but at least the structure of the ·early 
relations among the federal, state and tribal governments 
tended to involve the tribes, to some degree, in determinations 
that affected them. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries the 
Constitution, and the Nonintercourse Act, provided that major 
transactions between Indian tribes an d non-native governments 
should take place by federal treaty and thus, by definition, 
should involve both the United States and the relevant Indian 
tribe. 233 The Constitution gives the federal government the 
exclusive right to enter into treaties with Indian tribes,234 and 
the United States at first made extensive use of this right: by 
1846, the official compilation of federal treaties -with Indian 
tribes fi lled an entire volume of the United States Statutes at 
Large .235 
Towards the end of the 19th century, however, treaty-
making with Indian tribes fell victim to internecine 
congressional politics. In 1871, Congress decided to end the 
"practical exclusion" of the House of Representatives "from any 
policy role in Indian affairs" by requiring that Indian policy be 
set by bicameral legislation rather than by treaties entered into 
by the Executive branch with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.236 Accordingly, it passed a law providing that 
hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the 
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an 
232. Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715 (1943). 
233. Cf James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction in 
State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 583 (1994) (noting the view that obtained 
"during and subsequent to the Revolutionary period" that "[d]isputes between sovereign 
nations were to be resolved not through judicial process but through the negotiation of 
treaties, the exchange of ambassadors, and, if necessary, through war"); id. n.105 ("It 
was these methods of resolving disputes, of course, that the Constitution forbade to the 
states."). 
234. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832) 
(In addition to the Indian Commerce Clause, federal authority over Indian affairs also 
arises from "the powers of war and peace [and) of making treaties .") . 
235. See 7 Stat. 1-604 (1846); J. Res. 10 of Mar. 3, 1845, 5 Stat. 799 (1845) 
(directing the compilation of "all Treaties with ... Indian tribes"). The editor's note to 
the compilation observed that "[t)he constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as 
well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned 
the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and, consequently, admits their rank 
among those powers who are capable of making treaties." Indian Treaties, 7 Stat. 9 
(1846) (citing Worcester). 
236. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 202 (1975). 
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independent nation, tribe, or power ·with whom the Unit ed St ates 
m ay contract by tr eaty: Provided, ji!rther, ri'hat nothing herein 
contained sh all be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation 
of any tr eaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such 
Indian nation or tribe.237 
Given that throughout the 80 years prior to the passage of 
this act the federal executive had concluded numerous treaties 
·with Indian nations and the federal courts h ad u pheld an d 
enforced those treaties, the 1871 act's pronouncements on the 
constitut ional status of Indian nations -vvere a striking 
departure.238 But as one commentator has noted,239 if the act's 
characterization of Indian nations r aised one issue of 
departmental authority-by placing Congress in the role of 
constitutional interpret er240-it was likely designed to sidestep 
another-by masking the act's arrogation to Congress of a 
portion of the treaty-making power.241 
In any event, by the end of the 19th century the locus of 
povv-er over Indian affairs moved from a t reaty setting-in which 
the Indian nations had at least a nominal place242-to a 
legislative setting in which the Indian nations had no formal 
role243 and a judicial setting in which the r ole of Indian tribal 
237. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566, codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 
(1994) . 
238. See McSloy, supra note 30, at 243 (noting that "[f]or nearly a century of 
American national experience, and several prior centuries of European experience, 
treaties had been the formal mode of diplomatic relations with the Indians"). 
239. See id. at 243 n.196. 
240. See id. (arguing that the Act's purported interpretation of the constitutional 
term "foreign nation" raised a separation of powers issue, "particularly since the 
Supreme Court had already addressed precisely that constitutional definition in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)"). 
241. See id. ("That the House of Representatives sought to redefine its jurisdiction, 
not by explicitly seeking to include treaty ratification within its powers but instead by 
declaring that Indian nations could no longer be recognized, shows that Congress 
understood that it was changing the constitutional scheme and sought to handle the 
politically sensitive issue through semantic subterfuge."), 
242. On the other hand, it is well known that "[t]reaties [with Indian tribes] were 
sometimes consummated by methods amounting to bribery, or signed by representatives 
of only small parts of the signatory tribes. In accordance with the general rule 
applicable to foreign treaties, however, the courts will not inquire into whether an 
Indian tribe was properly represented during negotiation of a ratified treaty or whether 
such treaty was procured by fraud or duress." FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 230, at 
63 . 
243. For a time after 1871, "the federal government continued to enter into 
'agreements' with Native American tribes"-though such agreements now required the 
approval of both houses of Congress-but "[t]he last such agreement was entered into in 
1902." Siegfried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modem International Law, 7 
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litigan ts -vvas unclear . Eventually, in the 20th century, Congress 
v;ould make explicit its intent for Indian tribes to be able t o sue 
to enforce their r ights in feder al court; but in the meantime, the 
Cour t h ad begun it s drast ic expansion of state sover eign 
immunity. 244 
Th is h ist ory suggests why A rizona intervent ion is a 
creature of the 20th century: not because it is a departure from 
the federal structure conceived by the Framers, but because it is 
a modern manifestation of the very system they envisioned- a 
system in which the feder al government, joint ly with the Indian 
tribes, participates in the determination of Indian r igh ts . 
3. The practices of the Court 
On a more pragmatic level, A rizona follows a long tradit ion 
in which litigants have been allowed to intervene or otherwise 
participate in suits against states. Such participation, as the 
cases make clear, need not offend a st ate's immunity. 
Maryland v. Louisiana245 provides a modern illustration of 
this principle. The dispute in Maryland concerned a Louisiana 
tax (levied on pipeline companies) on the "first use" of any 
natural gas imported into Louisiana which was not previously 
taxed by another state or the United States.246 Claiming that 
this tax was unconstitutional, eight states filed an original 
action in the Supreme Court against Louisiana, seeking 
declar atory and injunctive relief and a r efund of taxes already 
paid.247 In addition to the eight plaintiff states, the forces 
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 567, 580 (1995). "With both houses of Congress involved, it did not 
take long for Congress to move from approving executive actions (the Indian 
'agreements' which now substituted for treaties) to initiating its own legislation." 
McSloy, supra note 30, at 244. Though in 1924 "all non-citizen Indians born within the 
territorial limits of the United States" were "declared to be citizens of the United States," 
Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, Indian nations continue to lack the "procedural 
protections" available to the states: "They do not enjoy senatorial representation nor do 
they send delegations to the House of Representatives. They often do not even enjoy de 
facto protections, as congressional districts often cut across tribal lines and reservation 
boundaries, states resist Indian voting rights, and language barriers inhibit the 
franchise." McSloy, supra note 30, at 260-61 (footnotes omitted). 
244. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
245. 451 U.S. 725 (1981). 
246. See id. at 731, 736. 
24 7. S ee id. at 734. The Court held that the st a tes were entitled to sue beca use they 
th emselves were substantial purch asers of gas, and because the challenged practice 
affected their general populations "in a substantial way," giving them an interest in 
suing "as parens patriae." Id. at 737. 
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arrayed against Louisiana included 17 pipeline companies,248 
which the Court allowed to intervene because they had "a direct 
stake in this controversy and in the interest of a full exposition 
of the issues."249 Accordingly, Louisiana was forced to contend 
with-at a minimum-three separate opposing counsel: one for 
the United States,250 at least one for the plaintiff states and at 
least one for the pipeline companies. 
In this respect, lv'Iaryland was hardly atypical, even among 
cases involving state defendants .251 In particular, a number of 
cases brought by the United States involving Indian tribes252 
illustrate that tribal litigants have taken the opportunity to 
make distinct additional arguments not presented by the United 
States ,253 without imposing undue burdens or creating problems 
248. See id. at 734. 
249. Jd. at 745 n. 21. The Court also noted "that it is not unusual to permit 
intervention of private parties in original actions;" but lest this suggest that it was 
drawing a distinction between such actions and those that originate in the district court, 
one of the two cases it cited was Trbouitch u. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972), 
in which the Court held that intervention should have been permitted in the district 
court. 
250. The Court also permitted the United States and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission to intervene as plaintiffs, see Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 
725, 745 n.21 (1981). 
251. In Oklahoma u. Texas , 258 U .S. 574 (1922), for example, the Court held that 
individuals could intervene in an original action between the named states concerning 
state boundary lines and the title to a river bed, because the Court had appointed a 
receiver to take possession of the disputed territory , see id. at 578, 580-81. As the Court 
explained, the individuals' claims "for particular tracts and funds in the receiver's 
possession and exclusively under our control" could not be brought before any other 
authority, and such claims "may be dealt with as ancillary to the suit wherein the 
possession is taken and the control exercised-and this although independent suits to 
enforce the claims could not be entertained in the court," id. at 581. Regardless of 
whether this holding is affected by the Court's statements in Pennhurst concerning 
pendent jurisdiction, see supra notes [17 4-81) and accompanying text, Oklahoma still 
stands as another illustration that the participation of individuals in suits against states 
is perfectly workable. 
Similarly, in Virginia u. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1 (1911), the Court allowed 
counsel for individual bondholders to participate as amicus curiae in Virginia's suit to 
force West Virginia to bear an equitable share of the bond debt, see id. at 10. And in 
North Carolina u. Tennessee, 235 U.S. 1 (1914), a boundary suit between the two states, 
the reporter noted that an individual had filed a brief "[b)y leave of court," id. at 2. 
252. See, e.g., United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(adjudicating appeal by United States and plaintiff-intervenor tribe), reu'd on other 
grounds, 450 U.S. 544, 546, 568 (1981) (United States and Crow Tribe were also 
represented by separate counsel before the Supreme Court); United States v. Michigan, 
623 F.2d 448, 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (two Indian tribes intervened in United 
States' suit to enforce treaty fishing rights and were separately represented as 
intervenors), order modified on other grounds, 653 F .2d 277 (6th Cir.). 
253 . For example, in United States ex rel. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe u. South 
Dakota, 105 F.3d 1552 (8th Cir. 1997), the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe intervened in an 
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of judicial administration. 
B. Arizona and the Court's Functional Concerns 
That the formal assessments outlined above lead back to 
functional questions should not be surprising, for as the Alden 
Court emphasized, its views of form rest on substantive 
foundations.254 In the present context, the results of the 
:functional analysis corroborate those of the formal inquiry, for 
both the United States' role in Arizona suits and the unique 
relationship between federal and tribal governments justify the 
use of Arizona intervention. 
1. The role of the federal plaintiff 
With respect to the Alden Court's functional analysis, 
Arizona suits start out with an obvious advantage over the qui 
tam suits discussed above: in an Arizona suit, by definition, the 
United States is an actual party plaintiff. The United States' 
presence in the suit, as will be seen below, addresses each of the 
Alden Court's substantive concerns about suits against states. 
a. Control 
In the crudest terms, to the extent that the Arizona theory 
is the sole basis for piercing a state defendant's sovereign 
immunity to a tribe's damages claims, the United States 
appears to have veto power over those claims. By dismissing its 
own claim, the federal plaintiff could give the state the 
opportunity to assert sovereign immunity to the claims of the 
tribe. 255 Of course, such power might seem to result in a blunt, 
action in which the United States sought declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief 
against South Dakota with respect to that State's imposition of an excise tax and 
registration fee on Indians living within reservation boundaries. See id. at 1554, 1555 & 
n.5. The Court of Appeals held that the district court should not have rejected the claim 
for damages pressed by the United States and the Tribe, since "[t]he Eleventh 
Amendment does not apply . .. because the United States brought the action." Id. at 
1560. Significantly, on appeal the Tribe, but not the United States, pressed the claim 
that South Dakota's excise tax should not apply to nonmember Indians residing on the 
Tribe's reservation; and though the Court ultimately rejected the Tribe's contention, it 
did so after a consideration of the merits . See id. at 1559-60. 
254. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2264 (1999) ("Underlying constitutional 
form are considerations of great substance."); id. at 2268 ("[I]n a Constitution as resilient 
as ours form mirrors substance."). 
255. If the United States were able to dismiss its claim with prejudice, the state 
defendant might also contend that the judgment dismissing the United States' claim 
bars the tribal plaintiffs claim on principles of res judicata. See Nevada v. United 
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a ll-or-nothing kind of control; but in practice the tribal plaintiffs 
are likely to work cooperatively with the federal plaintiff, not 
just because of common interests but also out of awareness that 
to assert the Arizona doctrine they need th e United States in the 
case. Also, to the extent that the federal trust responsibility to 
the tribal plaintiff would constrain the U nited States' ability to 
dismiss its claims against the state,256 that trust obligation 
States, 463 U .S. 110, 135 (1983) (Indian tribe "whose interests were r epresented .. . by 
the United States, can be bound by the . .. decree") . But such a rule is appropriate, if a t 
all, only where the United States has asserted the tribe's claim, not tried to expunge it . 
See, e.g., Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dep't of Interior , 798 F.2d 389, 390, 392 (lOth 
Cir. 1986) (noting that "intervention was proper because the government not only 
inadequately represented the Indian lessors whose interests were entrusted to it but a lso 
'in effect conceded the case a t the outset ,"' and holding that "[s]ince the intervenors wer e 
not adequately r epresented in the first instance, the prin ciple of res judicata does not 
apply to them"). A contrmy outcome would raise-among other concerns-separation of 
powers issues , for if a dismissal of the federal government's suit barred the tribal 
plaintiffs suit, the Executive branch would h ave the ability to extinguish whole causes of 
action created by Congress for Indian tribes. 
A more difficult question-in light of Nevada- ru:ises if the United States does 
not simply seek dismissal of its claim, but rather seeks dismissal as part of a settlement 
in which value flows to the tribe. Nevada , for instance, concerned the preclusive effect of 
a decree entered pursuant to a settlement agreement to which the United States-but 
not the relevant Indian reserva tion-was a party. Significantly, the settlement decree 
awarded the reservation considerable water rights , see Nevada , 463 U .S. at 117. Thus, 
the Court's holding in Nevada-that the reservation was bound by the settlement 
decree-should at least be limited to instances where the judgment arises from a 
settlement that provides significant value to the tribal plaintiff. 
Moreover, the Nevada Court's refusal to examine the adequacy of the United 
States' representation of the reservation's interests is in tension with the Arizona 
Court's determination that an Indian tribe should be allowed to participate in the 
determination of its rights. In the non-Indian context, the Court has made clear that 
considerable care is necessary to safegumd the interests of class members purportedly 
represented in the negotiation of a settlement agreement. See Ortiz v. Fibrebomd Corp., 
119 S. Ct. 2295 , 2315 (1999); Amchem Prods. , Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2252 
(1997). It would be worse than ironic if a different result were to obtain in the Indian 
law context on the basis of the federal government's trust obligation to Indian tribes. 
In any event, in practice this question can, and should, be avoided. Once the 
defendant has answered, under Rule 41 a voluntary dismissal requires either a 
stipulation signed by all parties, or an order of the court. See FED. R. Crv. P. 41(a). The 
tribal plaintiff can obviously block the former, and when the latter is requested, the 
court can simply provide in its order that the dismissal is without prejudice. This should 
not offend separation of powers principles, because the only discretion the court would be 
removing from the executive branch is the discretion to compromise a tribal claim 
against the wishes of the tribe; and such discretion itself, as discussed above, raises 
separation of powers concerns. 
256. Compare Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Wilson, 987 F. Supp. 804, 809 (N.D. Cal. 
1997) (holding that the United States had a fiduciary duty to sue California on behalf of 
the tribes to enforce the provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act because "absent 
representation, the Tribes will have no lega l remedy with which to bring the State to the 
bargaining table and obtain the benefits of IGRA"), with Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v . 
Reno, 56 F .3d 14 76, 14 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the Attorney General h ad 
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would obtain whether or not t he tribal plaintiff was in the suit. 
Accordingly, in an A rizona case the United States has as much 
ultimate control over the conduct of the suit as it would if it 
were the only plaintiff. 
b. Accountability 
In an Arizona suit, the United States, as an actual plaintiff, 
cannot avoid political accountability for the claims against the 
state. This fact helps explain why, as discussed in Part V.B. 
below, state sovereign immunity should not bar a tribal plaintiff 
from seeking more extensive relief than the United States 
requests. Of course, the Court has stated that "the impetus for 
the Eleventh Arnendment" was the "prevention of federal-court 
judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury."257 But in 
practical terms, the United States-which clearly has the right 
to seek relief from the state to the fullest extent allowed by 
law-is politically accountable, not only for the relief it seeks 
from the state, but also for the relief that its presence enables 
the tribe to seek from the state. Those affected by the claims for 
relief are unlikely to absolve the United States of responsibility 
for the demands of the tribal co-plaintiff, especially in cases 
where it is only the presence of the United States that enables 
the tribe's damages claims to proceed against the state. 
c. InfLuence 
The Court has, on occasion, expressed concern that if 
individuals were permitted to sue states, "the course of [the 
states'] public policy and the administration of their public 
affairs should be subject to and controlled by the mandates of 
judicial tribunals, without their consent, and in favor of 
discretion to refuse to assert water rights claims on behalf of the Shoshone-Bannock 
Tribes); id. at 1484 (Rogers, J ., and Wald, J., concurring) (noting that "as the federal 
government's trust responsibility toward a particular tribal resource increases in scope, 
the Attorney General's prosecutorial discretion contracts"). 
257. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994). The Court has 
further held that "it is the [state] entity's potential legal liability, rather than its ability 
or inability to require a third party to reimburse it, or to discharge the liability in the 
first instance, that is relevant." Regents of the Univ. of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 
431 (1997). To the extent that the Court's reasoning rests on the thought that liability 
visited on an insurer or the like would eventually raise the state's costs of insuring, this 
holding still implicates the immunity-from-liability theory; but to the extent that it r ests 
on the view that the state should be immune from purely symbolic legal liability 
regardless of any effect on state coffers, it appears to circle back to the digni ty interests 
discussed in Part IV.A.l. above. 
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individual interests."258 In this view, the "constitutional system 
of cooperative federalism" disfavors suits that "inter fere with [a 
state's] capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities ."259 
Here, again, Arizona raises no concerns. If the federal system 
affords states latitude to operate freely within their spheres of 
sovereignty, it does not grant them license to violate federal 
law;260 and ·while individuals may not be able to sue s tates to 
enforce this demarcation, it is well established that the United 
States can. 261 In sum, state sovereignty does not prevent the 
United States from disrupting a state's conduct of its own affairs 
by suing to enforce federal rights. 
In fact, Arizona suits serve the principles of "cooperative 
federalism" by ensuring that the Executive branch will be in a 
position to exert influence and-potentially-mediate disputes 
between the tribal plaintiff and the state defendant. As a 
plaintiff, the United States will likely be a party to any 
settlement negotiations and will be intimately knowledgeable 
about the status of the suit. This involvement will often give it 
the opportunity to use its influence with the various participants 
to try to reach a negotiated resolution. 
d. Judgment 
In an Arizona case, the claims against the state defendant 
will be screened by the federal government. While the tribal 
plaintiff may, as discussed in Part V.D. below, press alternative 
theories and seek additional relief, the tribal claims against the 
state defendant must arise from the same transaction as the 
claims by the United States. As a practical matter, this r ule 
satisfies the Alden concern with federal discretion, by ensuring 
258. Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887); see also Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 
2240, 2265 (1999) ("If the principle of representative government is to be preserved to 
the States, the balance between competing interests must be reached after deliberation 
by the political process established by the citizens of the State, not by judicial decree 
mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the private citizen."); but see id. at 
2289 n.36 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Court's position "comes perilously close to legitimizing political defiance of valid 
federal law"). 
259. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 n.24 (1979) (holding that a suit arising from 
a Nevada employee's traffic accident occurring outside Nevada would not interfere with 
Nevada's fulfillment of those responsibilities and thus this concern did not bar such a 
suit against Nevada in California state court). 
260. See, e.g. , Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266 (state sovereign immunity "does not confer 
upon the State a concomitant right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law"). 
261. See supra notes [199-201) and accompanying text. 
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that the federal plaintiff will be able to sift through the facts and 
decide which t r ansactions to sue upon. 
e. Burdens 
In an A rizona suit, the United States must commit its own 
resources and shoulder all the obligations of a litigant. It must 
allocate the funds necessary to pay the costs of litigation. It 
must abide by the same discovery rules as any other litigant . It 
is su bject to the disciplinary authority of the court. In short; the 
fe deral plaintiff in an Arizona suit m ust "put its money where 
its m outh is ." 
2. Fulfilling the trust relationship 
Arizona suits, then, fit the paradigm for federal suit s 
against states, and as such they avoid the bar of state sovereig-n 
immunity. To end the analysis there, however, would be to 
ignore additional reasons why Arizona intervention is uniquely 
appropriate to suits involving claims on behalf of Indian tribes. 
Specifically, one of the most important aspects of Arizona 
in tervention is its potential to aid the United States in fulfilling 
its sovereign commitment to the Indian tribes by empowering 
the tribes to participate in the assertion of their rights. The 
"proper fulfillment of [the United States'] trust require[s] 
turning over to the Indians a greater control of their own 
destinies."262 Thus, in Arizona, the Court justified the tribes' 
in tervention by noting that "the Indians are entitled 'to take 
their place as independent qualified members of the modern 
body politic'," and that "[a]ccordingly, the Indians' participation 
in litigation critical to their welfare should not be 
discouraged."263 In this respect, Arizona intervention directly 
promotes the United States' assertion of its sovereign interest in 
the fulfillment of its trust obligation.264 
Arizona intervention furthers the United States' fulfillment 
of its trust obligations by allowing the tribes to monitor and 
supplement the government lawyers' advocacy. Though the 
262. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,553 (1974). 
263. Arizona, 460 U.S. at 615 (quoting Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 
369 (1968)). 
264. Cf United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 
882-83 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that "the United States' very ability to sue as the tribes' 
trustee, which was unquestioned in Blatchford, depended on an injury to the United 
States as sovereign when injury was inflicted on the tribes"). 
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United States has the potential to be a powerful guardian, it is 
also often a conflicted one, for it represents many interests in 
a ddition to, and sometimes in opposition to, those of Indian 
tribes.265 And though the Court is willing, of necessity, to 
tolerate the United States' concurrent representation of diverse 
interests,266 it has noted Congress's concern with "situations in 
which the United States suffered from a conflict of interests or 
was otherwise unable or unwilling to bring suit as trustee for 
the Indians."267 Thus, the Court has emphasized that the 
assertion of Indian rights "should not depend on the good 
judgment or zeal of a government attorney."268 
Arizona itself is a case in point. In that case, the Tribes 
sought leave to intervene to assert rights that the United States 
had failed to press on their beha lf. 269 Not only had the United 
States omitted to present these claims, but initially it even 
opposed the Tribes' intervention. 270 And when, later , the federal 
government dropped its resistance to the Tribes' intervention 
and joined forces with them in pressing their claims, its claims 
on behalf of each Tribe were, in almost every instance, 
significantly smaller in scope than those asserted by the Tribes' 
attorneys. 271 These differences, far from raising an immunity 
issue, were rightly seen by the Special Master to weigh in favor 
of tribal intervention. 272 
It is of course true that the "conflicts" rationale for tribal 
265. See, e.g., Department of Justice Policy on Indian Sovereignty and Government-
to-Government Relations with Indian Tribes (unsigned, undated version found July 10, 
1999 at <http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/sovtrb.htm>) ("The Department represents the United 
States, in coordination with other federal agencies, in litigation brought for the benefit of 
Indian tribes and individuals, as well as in litigation by Indian tribes or individuals 
against the United States or its agencies. In litigation as in other matters, the 
Department may take actions and positions affecting Indian tribes with which one or 
more tribes may disagree."). 
266. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983) ("[I]t is simply 
unrealistic to suggest that the Government may not perform its obligation to represent 
Indian tribes in litigation when Congress has obliged it to represent other interests as 
well."). 
267. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 559 n.10 (1983) (discussing 
Congress's reasons for passing 28 U.S.C. § 1362); see id. at 557 (noting "the fact that the 
Indians ... might not be adequately represented by the United States in state court in 
light of conflicts of interest between the Federal Government's responsibilities as trustee 
and its own claims to water"). 
268. Poafpybitty, 390 U.S. at 374. 
269. See Arizona, 460 U.S. at 612. 
270. See id. 
271. See Special Master Report, supra note 150, at 3 & n.6. 
272. See id. at 11. 
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intervention may sometimes be in tension with the Court's view 
that suits by the United St ates against a state are permissible 
in part because the federal plaintiff is politically accountable for 
its actions. In certain situations, this very political 
accountability might result in pressure on the federal plaintiff to 
abandon an unpopular position which it is asserting on behalf of 
the tribe, and the tribe's ability to assert the position for itself 
might t hen be seen as neutralizing the effects of the 
government's political accountability. However, this concern is 
counterbalanced by two important considerations. First , the 
tribes' ability to assert positions that others press the United 
States to abandon may provide the tribes with an oppor tunity to 
demonstrate the merit of those positions and thus to inform the 
decision ultimately reached by the federal plaintiff.273 Though 
the Court may value the fact that the federal plaintiff is 
politically accountable, such accountability is not diminished by 
an opportunity for full consideration of the tribe's position. 
Second , in cases where there is no other basis on which the 
tribal plaintiff can seek damages against the state, the federal 
plaintiff retains ultimate control over the claim against the 
state.274 
In addition, the "accountability" argument should be 
considered in context. The Court's concern in Alden that a 
"politically responsib[le]" federal plaintiff exercise "control" over 
the litigation notwithstanding, 275 there is little apparent value 
in precluding a court from hearing the full range of valid 
arguments in support of the asserted claims. If a federal 
plaintiff fails to make an important argument-either because of 
a conflict of interest or because of a lack of resources or intimate 
knowledge of the tribe's interests-the tribal plaintiffs presence 
in the suit ensures that the tribe has the opportunity to inform 
the court of its view. To be sure, the state defendant benefits if 
the plaintiffs, collectively, omit a potentially winning argument; 
but surely sovereign prerogatives do not include the right to 
hoodwink a court. 
Similarly, a state's wish to avoid the burdens of litigation276 
273. Cf Resnik, supra note 21, at 757 (suggesting that one who values the dialogue 
between federal and tribal governments "would be supportive of enabling two voices , of 
cohabitation rather than domination, of having governments with different 'interests' 
and 'ideology' thus enabling 'innovation"'). 
274. See Part IV.B.1.a. above. 
275. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999). 
276. Qualified immunity has been justified on the grounds that the specter of 
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should not enable it to muzzle those who can provide useful 
information to the court. Although the Court has intimated that 
sovereign immunity may serve to protect states from litigation 
burdens,277 the weight of this rationale is unclear because the 
Court customarily adverts to more amorphous dignity concerns 
as well. As the Court :cecently stated, while Eleventh 
Amendment immunity "is justified in part by a concern that 
States not be unduly burdened by litigation, its u ltimate 
justification is the impmtance of ensuring that the States> 
dignitary interests can be fully vindicated."278 The Court's 
habitual resort t o th e dignity rationale may have a llmved it to 
avoid considering fully whether the "burden" concern is apposite 
in questions of state-as opposed to individual-immunity. 
In any event, the state can have no legitimate complaint 
about the burdens imposed by a suit by the United States;279 and 
the Arizona case demonstrates that no undue additional burden 
is posed by tribal intervention. In Arizona, the Court permitted 
the assertion of claims by five separate tribes-apparently 
represented by at least three different counsel280-in addition to 
the United States. The Special l\1aster rejected the states' 
argument "that representation of the Tribes' interests by both 
litigation could chill government employees in the exercise of their duties and deter 
others from seeking government employment. Individual defendants may well face 
personal stigma and familial stress from being sued; their limited personal resources will 
likely render them risk-averse with respect to the outcome of the suit; and these and 
other effects of the suit will likely distract them from their work. See Green v. Brantley, 
941 F.2d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir. 1991) (en bane) (holding that refusal to grant a defendant 
summary judgment based on qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the 
collateral order doctrine, even if an additional damages claim will proceed to trial 
anyway). 
But whatever the merits of this concern as applied to individuals, its 
persuasiveness diminishes markedly when invoked as a justification for state sovereign 
immunity, for a state is better able to defend suits, and less likely to be affected by their 
pendency, than is an individual official. Cf Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. 
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 150 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing 
the right of immediate appeal of denials of qualified immunity as based on the concern 
that "the specter of a long and contentious legal proceeding in and of itself would inhibit 
government officials from exercising their authority with the freedom and independence 
necessary to serve the public interest"). 
277. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 147. 
278. Id. (holding that a denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity is immediately 
appealable under the collateral order doctrine). 
279. The general proposition stated in Puerto Rico Aqueduct that the Eleventh 
Amendment prevents the states from being subjected "to the coercive process of judicial 
tribunals at the instance of private parties," 506 U.S. at 146 (internal quotation marks 
omitted), applies by its own terms to "private" suits and not to claims asserted by the 
United States. 
280. See Special Master Report, supra note 150, at 9 n.l6_ 
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reasoning that the states' concerns could be addressed by 
ensuring that the "or der of proof and examination" were 
"structured in a logical sequence which avoids duplication or 
accumulation ."282 
In fact, Arizona's view accords with the long practice in the 
federal courts of allovving parties to intervene or othe:rwise 
participate in suits against states .283 Likewise, since the claims 
of A rizona intervenors will concern the same transactions put at 
issue by the United States' claims284 and since district judges 
h ave ample ability to shape the presentation of the issues and 
avoid cumulative arguments and evidence,285 the tribal 
interven01·'s presentation will increase the state's litigation 
burdens only to the extent that it bears upon the matters 
already before the court. Any right a state may have to be free 
of litigation burdens does not, surely, include a right to 
circumscribe the facts and law presented in support of the 
government's claims.2S6 
Finally, tribal participation in federal suits against states, 
to the extent it aids the presentation of the issues, can be seen 
as one way to strengthen federal protections in an area that 
suffers from chronic underenforcement of federal rights. As a 
general matter, the Court's view of state sovereign immunity is 
colored by its "unwilling[ness] to assume the States will refuse 
to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United 
States."287 Since "[t]he States and their officers are bound by 
obligations imposed by the Constitution and by federal 
statutes," any shortfall in federal enforcement capabilities is 
281. Id. at 14. 
282. Id. at 16. 
283. See Part IV.A.3. above. 
284. See Part V.B. below. 
285. See Part V.D. below. 
286. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, 
Agencies and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 746 (1968) (noting with respect to 
agency proceedings that "the very fact that the intervener-from the vantage point of his 
own interest-sees the case with a perspective and perhaps an intensity different from 
that of the agency charged with the protection of the public as a whole may indicate that 
he can in fact contribute to the court's total understanding"); THE LAWYER'S CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 7-23 (noting that "[t]he 
complexity of law often makes it difficult for a tribunal to be fully informed unless the 
pertinent law is presented by the lawyers in the cause," and noting that this 
presentation is a requisite of the adversary system). 
287. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999). 
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counterbalanced by "[t]he good faith of the States ."288 In the 
context of Indian law, however, the states' good faith has all too 
often been remarkable for its absence. Indeed, the fi r st 
Congress passed the Nonintercourse Act specifically t o protect 
Indian tribes from fraudulent land transactions, many of which 
were perpetrated by the states themselves . Nearly a century 
afterward, th e Court would note that "[b] ecause of the local ill 
feeling, the people of the states where [Indian tribes] are found 
are often their deadliest enemies."289 Even today, federal courts 
grapple with the continuing effects of the states' :'highhanded 
attitude" in dealing with Indian tribes "throughout history."290 
Accordingly, in the unique context of Indian law, Arizona 
intervention is more than permissible: it is n ecessary. 
V. ARIZONA IN PRACTICE 
Arizona intervention, thus, is doctrinally justified even 
under the current Court's expansive views of state sovereign 
immunity. This section examines several of the procedural 
questions that may anse 1n connection with Arizona 
intervention. 
A. Does it Matter Who First Brings the Claim? 
Although this Article refers to Arizona intervention as 
shorthand for the tribal participation approved in Arizona, the 
Arizona question may arise in a number of procedural contexts. 
Whether those permutations give rise to the same result should 
depend on their functional similarity to Arizona, rather than on 
mere formal distinctions. 
Litigation commenced by the United States is perhaps the 
simplest case, for the intervention of a tribal plaintiff in an 
existing suit by the United States, pursuant to Arizona, 
obviously does not enlarge the court's jurisdiction. Likewise, 
litigation commenced jointly by the United States and a tribe 
raises no special issues under Arizona. And where the United 
States has intervened in an existing tribal suit against private 
entities, and the federal and tribal plaintiffs move concurrently 
to amend their respective complaints to add state defendants, 
288. Id. 
289. United States v. Kagama, 118 U .S. 375, 384 (1886). 
290. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, No. 80-CV-930 & 80-CV-960, 1999 WL 
224615, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. April 15, 1999) (discussing New York State's treatment of 
Cayuga Indians). 
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the procedural stance is functionally the same as m a suit 
brought simultaneously by the United States and the tribe. 
A more interesting question arises where a t:ribe h as sued a 
state and the United States later intervenes and also asserts 
claims against the state. In this situation, the state might seek 
dismissal of the tribe's claim on the ground that the court never 
originally had jurisdiction over that claim. If the state has 
omitted to raise a sovereign immunity challenge prior to the 
United States' assertion of its own claim against the state, the 
state's contention should fai l since the question of sovereign 
immunity need not be considered until it is pressed by the 
state291-at which point the proceeding is functionally similar to 
one brought simultaneously by the federal and tribal 
plaintiffs. 292 
Even if the state raised its immunity claim prior to the 
United States' intervention, however, it should prove no more 
successful. 'Nhen an original plaintiffs suit is dismissed for lack 
of jurisdiction, the court has discretion to retain an intervenor's 
pleading and treat it as a separate action. 293 Thus, the United 
States' complaint could still proceed-and the tribal plaintiff 
could then seek intervention in the United States' action to 
assert its claims294 against the state.295 Given that the tribal 
291. See Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S. Ct. 2047, 2052 (1998) . 
292. To the extent that a court might reason that dismissal would be warranted due 
to the initial lack of jurisdiction, under the analysis explained below the court should 
nonetheless not dismiss the tribe's complaint. 
293. See Mille Lacs Band v. Minnesota, 124 F .3d 904, 913 (8th Cir. 1997); Town of 
West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) 
(quoting 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 1917, at 458-59 (2d. ed. 1983)). 
294. A dismissal on jurisdictional grounds is not on the merits, see FED. R. CIV. P. 
41(b), and accordingly, dismissal on the basis of state sovereign immunity has no res 
judicata effect. See, e.g., Voisin's Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F .2d 183, 188 (5th 
Cir. 1986). Although the Court has not yet decided whether state sovereign immunity is 
a matter of subject matter jurisdiction or of personal jurisdiction, see Schacht, 118 S. Ct. 
at 2054 (observing that the question is undecided with respect to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity); id. at 2055 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting similarities to both subject 
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction), both sorts of jurisdictional dismissals are 
without prejudice under Rule 41(b). See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER 
& EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 4436, at 344 (1981). And 
while a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds will bar relitigation of the particular 
jurisdictional issue decided, see id. at 340, this rule is inapplicable here because a suit by 
the federal government, in which a tribal plaintiff intervenes, presents a different state 
sovereign immunity question than a suit by the tribal plaintiff alone. 
295. Thus, in one of the S eneca cases the court held that a tribe's claims against a 
state could proceed even though the United States did not seek to intervene in the action 
until after the state had raised its Eleventh Amendment defense against the tribe's 
claims. See Seneca Nation v. New York, 26 F . Supp.2d 555, 564-65 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) 
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plaintiffs claims could thus be heard nonetheless, efficiency 
counsels that the court refuse to dismiss those claims once t'ne 
United States has sought to intervene.296 
B. Can a Tribe Bring Additional Claims and Seeh More 
Extensive R elief? 
A rizona suggests that a tribal plaintiff may assert ctmms 
that differ from those of the United States, so long as the tribal 
claims arise from the same transaction as the United States' 
claims. Likewise , although it is n ot clear to what extent a tribal 
plaintiff can ultimately recover damages in an amount greater 
than is sought by the United States, it is well established that 
t r ibal plaintiffs can seek such relief as an initial matter. 
One of the reasons that the Court granted the Tribes' 
request to intervene in Arizona was that "the United States' 
action as their representative will bind the Tribes to any 
judgment. "297 A state that defends against tribal claims 
asserted by the federal government will likely claim in any later 
litigation that claims by the tribe that arise out of the same 
transaction or series of related transactions are barred by th e 
doctrine of claim preclusion.298 There is consequently a certain 
symmetry to the Court's reasoning that the states involved in 
the Arizona case "no longer may assert [sovereign] immunity 
with respect to the subject matter of this action."299 Thus, at 
least one court has read Arizona to establish that '"new claims 
or issues' may be raised [by the tribal plaintiff] so long as those 
issues or claims encompass the same subject matter as the 
original claims or issues [asserted by the United States] ."300 
(holding that since the tribal plaintiff "would still be entitled to intervene in the United 
States' case" if its own case were dismissed, "[t)he interest of judicial economy is best 
served by allowing the Senecas' claims to continue"); see also Mille Lacs Band, 124 F.3d 
at 913 (fact that the United States was merely a plaintiff-intervenor was "not 
controlling" for Eleventh Amendment purposes). 
296. Arizona itself demonstrates the propriety of this outcome. The claims that the 
Tribes were permitted to assert in Arizona were initially raised by the Tribes and only 
belatedly asserted by the United States, and by the time intervention was granted no 
other issues remained to be determined. 
297. Arizona v. Califomia, 460 U.S. 605, 615 (1983). 
298. See supra note 255. 
299. Arizona, 460 U.S. at 614. 
300. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, Nos. 80 CV-930 & 80-CV-960, 1999 WL 
509442, at *13. The court in Cayuga noted that "at the same time the Arizona Court 
stated that '[t]he Tribes [were) not seek[ing) to bring new claims or issues against the 
state,' it recognized that in the Tribes' motion to intervene they made 'claims for 
additional water rights to reservation lands."' Id. (quoting Arizona, 460 U.S. at 612) 
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th at the Tribes seek n o great er relief than the United States, it 
plainly would not have approved the Special l\/Iaster's grant of 
intervention , for th e Tribes' requests in almost all instances 
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C. A re There Special Pleading Requirernents ? 
If a tribal plaintiff may seek more extensive rehef than its 
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does not require that the pleadings of the federal and tribal 
plaintiffs be identical. But even apart from the tribe's ability to 
seek greater relief, th e principles of notice pleading make clear 
that the tribe's complaint need not be confined to the relief 
demanded in the United States' complaint . 
'While the Federal Rules require that a party's pleading 
include "a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader 
seeks ,"302 they also provide that "[e]xcept as to a party against 
whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is 
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not dem anded such 
relief in the party's pleadings."303 Thus , "[a] party's r ecovery is 
limited to the amount prayed for in its demand for judgment 
only in cases where judgment is entered by default,"304 and a 
plaintiff "need not set forth any theory or demand any par ticular 
relief for the court will award appropriate relief if the plaintiff is 
entitled to it on any theory."305 "If a pleading provides a 
defendant notice of the plaintiffs claims and the grounds for the 
claims, omissions in a prayer for relief do not bar redress of 
(alterations in original); but see Seneca Nation v. New York, 178 F .3d 95, 97 (2d Cir . 
1999) (per curiam) (stating in dictum that "the State of New York retains its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity to the extent that the Seneca Nation of Indians or the 
Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians raise claims or issues that are not identical to those 
made by the United States"), cert. denied, 2000 WL 11856 (Jan. 10, 2000). 
301. See supra notes [166-67) and accompanying text. 
302. FED. R. CN. P. 8(a)(3). 
303. FED. R. CN. P . 54(c). 
304. Scala v. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc., 985 F .2d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(rejecting contention that jury award should be reduced because it exceeded amount 
demanded in original complaint). 
305. Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 80 F .3d 895, 900 (4th Cir . 1996) 
(quoting New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323 F .2d 20, 24-25 (4th Cir . 1963)). 
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th at a party will not necessarily know, when initiating a claim, 
precisely what the evidence will show or what will he the most 
appropriate relief. In joint federal-tribal litigation, this 
uncertainty would raise problems if sovereign immunity issues 
turned on the relief sought by each plaintiff at the outset. 
Private litigants may quite properly resolve uncertainty by 
claiming all relief to which they anticipate they could 
conceivably demonstrate a viable claim. 3°7 By contrast, the 
federal government-out of concerns over scarce lit igation 
resources308 or the like-may omit from its prayer for relief 
components that, as the litigation progresses and the evidence 
unfolds, it may later wish to claim on the tribe's behalf.309 
Thus, the fact that a tribe's pleading requests more or 
different relief than the pleading filed by the United States 
should be irrelevant. 
D. Who Can Make What Arguments? 
One of the key principles underlying Arizona is that Indian 
tribes must be allowed to "participat[e] in litigation critical to 
their welfare."310 Inherent in meaningful participation is the 
ability to make arguments and present evidence not put forward 
by the federal trustee. 3ll Thus, courts should place no abnormal 
306. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. East Dayton Tool & Die Co., 14 F .3d 1122, 1127 
(6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). 
307. For instance, under the Federal Rules it is permissible to include in a 
complaint allegations that presently lack evidentiary support, so long as the attorney 
filing the complaint can certifY that such allegations "are likely to have evidentiary 
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery." FED. R. 
Crv. P. 11(b)(3). 
308. Once the federal government sues a state on a tribe's behalf, it has met the 
Alden Court's requirement that the United States place its resources behind the claim 
against the state. To require in addition that the United States seek, from the outset, 
each specific aspect of relief that a tribe requests would be to strain the Court's 
reasoning beyond any practical purpose. If a claim is important enough to prompt the 
United States to sue a state, it is important enough to warrant a court's consideration of 
all valid forms of relief, including those pressed initially by the tribe alone. 
309. Although courts will refuse to grant belatedly requested relief where its award 
would be unfairly prejudicial, see, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424 
(1975), it is hard to imagine prejudice arising in the context addressed here, where the 
very basis for the state's challenge would be that the tribe has given notice, in its own 
pleading, that it seeks different or more extensive relief than that sought by the federal 
government. 
310. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S . 605, 615 (1983). 
311. As discussed in Part IV.B.2. above, the tribe's ability to supplement the United 
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lim.itations on a tribe's advocacy of claims it presses n1 common 
vvith the United States . 
Obviously, this is not to say that Arizona intervention will 
lead to a litigation free-for-all. Just as in any other case, the 
district judge has the ability to oversee the course of 
discovery,312 protect the parties from unreasonable demands,313 
maintain control of pretrial proceedings314 and guide the conduct 
of the trial.315 The trial judge's authority to structure the 
proceeding, coupled with the fact that an Arizona intervenor's 
claims against a state will arise from the same transaction(s) as 
the claims brought by the United States,316 will ensure that the 
presence of the Arizona intervenor creates no undue litigation 
burdens . 
E'. Does it lVIatter That a Tribe Might Appeal Even If the United 
States Does Not? 
A state defendant might contend that, if the federal 
government does not appeal from a judgment, an appeal by a 
tribe317 will offend state sovereign immunity. Arguably, neither 
States' presentation not only benefits the tribe, and the accurate presentation of the 
issues, but also aids the United States in fulfilling its trust responsibility to the tribe. 
312. S ee, e.g., FED. R Crv. P . 26(b)(2) (court may limit unreasonably cumulative or 
duplicative discovery); FED. R Crv. P. 26(d) (upon motion, and for the convenience of 
parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice , the court may set parameters for 
the timing and sequence of discovery). 
313. See, e.g., FED. R Crv. P. 26(c) (where movant shows good cause, court may 
issue orders to protect a party from, inter alia, undue burden and expense arising from 
discovery requests). 
314. See, e.g., FED. R Crv. P. 16 (court may hold pretrial conferences to establish 
and maintain control of pretrial proceedings). 
315. See, e.g., FED. R Evm. 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by, inter alia, "considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence"); 2 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 403.06[1] at 403-60 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, gen. ed., 2d ed. 1999) ("[T]rial 
judges have wide discretion to exclude [cumulative evidence] so they may conduct trials 
efficiently."). 
316. Thus, the relevant evidence will be overlapping if not identical, and its 
presentation can be structured, with the guidance of the court, so as not to prolong 
unduly the proceedings. By contrast, presentation of a claim that is entirely factually 
unrelated to the United States' claims would be more likely to expand the scope and 
length of the proceedings to an extent that could raise legitimate concerns. 
317. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 375-76 (1987) 
("An intervenor, whether by right or by permission, normally has the right to appeal an 
adverse final judgment by a trial court."); see also 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR 
R MILLER & EDWARD H . COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 3902.1, at 109 
& n.13 (2d ed. 1991) (citing Stringfellow). 
170 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 61 
functional concerns·318 nor r elevant doctrines319 support such a 
318. If a case is important enough for the United States to litigate it to conclusion at 
the level of the district court, the United States' decision not to commit resources to an 
appeal should not be taken as a sign that the case is low priority. At the district court 
level , the question of resources is essentially a financial one, and a plausible argument 
can be made that the Fra mers were cognizant of this limitation when they crafted the 
Constitution. After all , it was readily apparent during the early days of th e Union that 
the United States' powers of enforcement through litigation would be limited by the 
scarcity of its funds. On appeal, however, the impact on the United States' litigation 
budget is likely to be less, and the more pressing question will be whether the United 
States is willing to seek appella te attention on the matter a t hand, possibly a t the 
expense of securing appellate scrutiny of other matter s. This consideration, unlike the 
financial concern, is unlikely to have been part of the Framers' calculus, since the 
Framers presuma bly did not anticipate the present scope of substantive federal law, the 
concomitant profusion of federal statutes and enforcement agencies, or the resulting 
number of cases in which the federa l government would wish to seek appellate review. 
Accordingly, it is unlikely that the states, in consenting to suit by the United States, 
would h ave relied on the concept that the federal government would be self-limiting in 
the number of matters which it chose to appeal. 
Moreover , even if the United States' failure to appeal is instead a response to 
political concerns, this should not mean that the appellate courts should be divested of 
their ability to hear the appeal. A st ate's interest in retaining the benefit of an incorrect 
district court decision is flimsy compared with the interest of the federal system in the 
uniformity and correctness of federal law. 
319. For instance, there is some doctrinal support for the view tha t the Eleventh 
Amendment does not apply to appellate proceedings . "(A] State does not consent to suit 
in federal court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation." College 
Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2226 
(1999) (citing Smith v. Reeves, 178 U .S. 436, 441-45 (1900)) . But it is well settled that 
the Supreme Court can review the judgment of a state's highest court, "even when a 
State is a formal party [defendant] and is successful in the inferior court," because the 
proceeding before the Supreme Court "is not a suit within the meaning of the [Eleventh] 
Amendment." McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages, 496 U.S. 18, 27 (1990) 
(quoting General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 233 (1908) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
Of course, Supreme Court review of state-court judgments presents issues 
distinct from those raised by intermediate appellate review of federal district court 
judgments; but the doctrine that the Supreme Court can review state-court judgments in 
cases involving states has its roots in "a time when individual litigants could invoke 
review in the Supreme Court as a matter of right." James E. Pfander, An Intermediate 
Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Federal Appellate Court Review of State-Court 
Judgments After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. REV. 161, 226 (1998)-a pedigree which 
suggests the two contexts may share a greater similarity than is at first apparent. See 
id. at 225 ("One has difficulty in seeing how the Eleventh Amendment could 
simultaneously leave untouched the Court's own exercise of appellate authority and 
curtail all other federal appellate power."). 
The concept that an appeal is not a "suit" within the meaning of the 
Amendment has been subject to criticism, particularly by proponents of the "diversity" 
theory. See supra note 28. As Justice Souter has observed, "[w]hether or not an appeal 
is a 'suit' in its own right, it is certainly a means by which an appellate court exercises 
jurisdiction over a 'suit' that began in the courts below." Seminole Tribe, 517 U .S. at 113 
n.10 (Souter, J. , joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Likewise, in the 
leading discussion of the issue, Professor Jackson has offered reasons why "the 
proposition that a 'suit' does not include an 'appeal' is only barely plausible." Vicki C. 
Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 
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position. But at any rate, states should not be able to avoid 
A rizona intervention merely by raising the specter of such an 
appeal. The possibility that a tribe might t ake an appeal in 
which the United States did not join320 raises no more of an 
issue than does the possibility that the United States might 
decide, part-way through the litigation, to drop its claim.321 In 
either event, the state can raise its argument once the tribe is on 
its own; but until then, hypothetical scenarios provide no basis 
for barring a tribe's claim. (If the contrary were t rue, it would 
not have been proper for the Special Master to have permitted 
the Tribes to intervene in Arizona, for although A rizona was an 
original proceeding in the Supreme Court, the parties could and 
did take exception to the Supreme Cour t from the 
determinations of the Special Master, a process lit tle different in 
function from taking an appeal from th e determinations of a 
98 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1988). These critiques, however, appear to presume the validity of 
the diversity theory, for if instead, as the majority of the Court believes, state sovereign 
immunity is a constitutional bar to federal question suits against states, then the 
conclusion that an appeal is a "suit" would prevent Supreme Court review of numerous 
state-court decisions on federal questions. Notwithstanding that the diversity theory is 
considerably more plausible than the current Court's account, the latter is the law of the 
land, and it provides litigants with a basis on which to argue that appeals are not barred 
by state sovereign immunity. 
320. On a practical note, in such event the tribal appellant should ask the appellate 
court to vacate the dismissal of the United States' claims as well as the tribe's. Although 
an appellant normally lacks standing to assert the rights of co-parties, courts have 
recognized exceptions where there is a particularly close relationship between the 
appellant and the other party. Moreover, an appellate court has the power to afford 
relief to a non-appellant if necessary in order to grant effective relief to the appellant. 
See, e.g., Goldie's Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 468 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984) 
("The Levins have standing to contest the grant of the preliminary injunction issued 
against the other defendants, even though those defendants have not appealed .... 
Even if the injunction is vacated as to the Levins, an injunction in effect against the 
Superior Court, the Sheriff, the Clerk, and the Marshall leaves the Levins powerless to 
enforce their state court judgment."); see also 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 3902, at 73 & n.16 
(1992) (citing Goldie's Bookstore). In cases where the Arizona doctrine is the tribal 
plaintiff's sole means of avoiding state sovereign immunity problems, effective relief to 
the tribal appellant will require the reinstatement of the United States' claims as well. 
Cf Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1986) (allowing Maine-which had intervened 
below because the federal crime involved a state statute-to appeal and seek 
reinstatement of the guilty plea in a federal criminal case in which the United States 
dismissed its appeal from the reversal of the defendant's guilty plea); Sanguine, Ltd. v. 
United States Dep't of Interior, 798 F.2d 389, 390-91 (lOth Cir. 1986) (after United 
States consented to decree enjoining enforcement of a rule adopted by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, nine Native Americans intervened to defend their interests in the rule's 
enforcement; court held that "this case presents a unique situation in which prejudice to 
the intervenors can be avoided only by setting aside the prior judgment and allowing the 
opportunity to litigate the merits of the case"). 
321. See supra note 255 . 
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lower court.) 
CONCLUSION 
The discussion above makes clear that some tensions may 
arise, in the context of Arizona intervention, between the United 
States' interest in maintaining control of the litigation and a 
tribal plaintiff's efforts to protect tribal interests . Under the 
Arizona doctrine, a tribal plaintiff arguably can assert 
additional claims relating to the same transaction sued upon by 
the United States and can seek additional relief. The tribe may 
also make arguments that differ from those made by the United 
States. 1-\nd if the United States decides not to appeal an 
adverse judgment, the tribal plaintiff may attempt to do so in its 
stead. 
Such tensions, however, do not mean that a tribal plaintiffs 
intervention offends state sovereign immunity. Participation by 
a tribal intervenor should aid the United States in fulfilling its 
trust obligations to the tribe by allowing the tribe to monitor 
and supplement the United States' presentation of claims and 
issues. Moreover, while a tribal intervenor can affect the course 
of the litigation in important ways, the United States always 
has the option of seeking to dismiss its own claims. To the 
extent that the Arizona doctrine provides the sole basis for a 
tribe's assertion of claims against a state defendant, the United 
States' power to dismiss its own complaint gives it veto power 
over the tribal claims. Concededly, the United States' dismissal 
of its claims is constrained by the federal trust responsibility, 
but that fact does not affect the Alden analysis. Rather, if 
fiduciary responsibilities narrow or eliminate the United States' 
discretion to seek dismissal of its claims when a tribal 
intervenor is a party to the suit, the same responsibilities would 
apply to a suit by the United States alone. In sum, participation 
by a tribal intervenor does not diminish the United States' 
ultimate discretion to guide the course of the suit, and thus it 
presents no problem under Alden. 
Consequently, courts' long-standing practice of permitting 
Arizona intervention by tribal litigants should continue 
undisturbed by the Court's current vision of state sovereign 
immunity. Though the Court's recent decisions have extended 
state sovereign immunity far beyond the textual limits of the 
Eleventh Amendment and will, in the view of many, create 
significant and unwarranted problems in the enforcement of 
federal laws, in the particular context of tribal intervention in 
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federal suits against states the Alden Court's analysis merely 
reinforces Arizona's continued viability. 
